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1.-INTRODUCTION 
The delivery or payment of social benefits to beneficiaries is one of the primary 
objectives of most governments and it accounts for a large proportion of their expenditure. 
In most countries, mandatory spending1 rises with the number of eligible beneficiaries 
(mainly due to population ageing) and prices. These increases are included without any 
further action by the governments2. Cost estimates of deferred payment programs are 
especially susceptible to misstatement in cash-basis budgetary accounting systems 
(Phaup, 2019).  
It is important that the financial statements report the pension disbursements, and any 
associated liabilities, appropriately (Mason, 2018). The financial reporting method used 
for most of the social security systems (SSSs) around the world is based exclusively on 
cash accounting (see appendix 1) which is not a suitable framework for accounting for 
the assets and liabilities allocated to pay for the scheduled benefits. Reporting should be 
based mainly on the accrual accounting principle (see appendix 1), the fundamental 
cornerstone of good financial management.  
Many countries have adopted the accrual accounting principle in the wave of “New Public 
Management reform” which considers the implementation of this methodology as a tool 
to gain wider accountability; to demonstrate that resources are used economically, 
efficiently, and effectively and as intended; to demonstrate value for money; to assess 
solvency and sustainability; to determine the costs of public services; to enhance 
monitoring of liabilities and contingent liabilities; and to record the complete stock of 
assets and liabilities (see appendix 1), in balance sheets (Cavanagh et al., 2016; Dabbicco, 
2015; IMF, 2014). 
Employment-related pension programs for non-public-sector employees are often 
required to be fully funded under national laws. In these benefit plans, liabilities and 
contribution requirements are normally determined based on standard actuarial 
techniques. As a result of a change in accounting standards over the past 25 years, these 
firms are required to include unfunded pension liabilities in their corporate balance sheets. 
If assets equal or exceed accrued liabilities, the plan is considered to be fully funded, but 
to the extent that liabilities exceed assets, these unfunded liabilities should be shown on 
the sponsor’s balance sheet (De Vries, 2010).  
Similarly, greater attention is being placed on the impact of social security liabilities and 
assets on the government’s balance sheet. There is a global ongoing debate to increase 
the transparency of the liabilities (obligations)3 of SSSs. The disclosure of the above-
mentioned liabilities has been frequently requested by national and international reporting 
bodies for financial reporting.  
Statistical, accounting and actuarial guidelines for valuing the liabilities of social security 
(SS) programmes are published by the United Nations (EC et al. (2009), EU (Eurostat, 
2010), International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014), International Public Sector Accounting 
Board (IPSASB, 2017 a, 2017 b, 2017 c; 2019), International Actuarial Association (IAA, 
                                                 
1 The definitions of “mandatory spending” and other terms appear in the Glossary, appendix 1. The benefits 
paid by social security systems are considered mandatory spending.  
2 In some countries, this is also due to a bad practice known as “populism in pensions” (see Appendix 1). 
3 In this paper the terms liability and obligation are understood to be synonyms given that in actuarial 
language we usually speak about assets and liabilities, but some authors distinguish both terms. For IAA 
(2018), an obligation is a promise based on current law or regulations, or on a social contract; a commitment 
to pay a particular sum of money; a duty or a responsibility. An obligation is also a liability when there is 
a legal responsibility for the obligation, as in a legal debt.  
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2013; 2018) and national standard setters such as the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
of the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA, 1998) and the Canadian Institute of 
Actuaries (CIA, 2017), to name just a few. These standard setters have different 
approaches to the accounting, actuarial, funding and disclosure requirements of different 
types of pension programmes; and are ambiguous, inconsistent, and are not fully 
enforced. Even when standards reach the same conclusion, the rationale is different 
(Wiener and Stokoe, 2018). 
This paper is in line with the ongoing debate on how to recognize and measure assets and 
liabilities of SSSs. It develops a full accounting model for monitoring the solvency of a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) pension scheme (see Appendix 1) with permanent 
disability and minimum pension benefits.  
The paper builds on previous work carried out dealing with the so-called “Swedish” open 
group (SOG) approach, and with pension schemes combining permanent disability and 
retirement within an NDC framework. The starting points are the papers by Ventura-
Marco and Vidal-Meliá (2014), Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017), TSPS (2018) and Vidal-
Meliá et al. (2018). Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá (2014) inspired by the Swedish 
model, developed as a theoretical basis for compiling a Swedish ABS for a DB PAYG 
scheme with retirement and disability benefits. Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) develop a 
Swedish-type ABS for an NDC scheme with disability and minimum pension benefits. 
TSPS (2018) is the most recent annual report of the Swedish pension system and presents 
its financial status and income statement along with a description of the accounting 
principles used for valuing the system’s assets and liabilities. Finally, the paper by Vidal-
Meliá et al. (2018) develop a social insurance accounting model for an NDC scheme 
combining retirement and long-term care (LTC) contingencies. 
The paper uses the Swedish pension system’s most recent annual report as a benchmark 
(TSPS, 2018), and extends the model developed by Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) by 
adding an income statement, which fully explains the reasons behind the changes in the 
system’s solvency by type of benefit. In line with the reference model, assets and 
liabilities are measured at present value at each reporting date, and changes in present 
value are reported in each period as income or expenses and are included on the income 
statement. 
This paper contributes to filling a gap in the literature because little attention has been 
paid to the SOG approach. It is at least surprising that in a recent special issue of an 
international journal4 which addressed the topic of the actuarial and financial reporting of 
SS obligations, none of the published papers referred to this approach. We are convinced 
that our paper is timely because there are important issues that need further research, for 
instance, the link between the SOG approach and the most classical approaches explored, 
and also because our proposed income statement could serve as a guidance to improve 
the true and fair view (see Appendix 1) of the Swedish actuarial balance sheet through a 
better determination of the changes in the system's net worth. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 looks into the 
methodology labelled as “Swedish” open group developed for measuring liabilities and 
assets in contributory SSSs; the most relevant features are identified and compared to the 
traditional approaches and a literature review is also provided. Section 3 presents the main 
characteristics of a social insurance accounting model for an NDC scheme including 
retirement, disability and minimum pension benefits (MPB) for both contingencies. 
                                                 
4 International Social Security Review, Vol 71, issue 3. 
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Special attention is paid to the income statement, the real novelty of the model and the 
rationale behind why presenting the income statement of a hypothetical already-
functioning NDC (PAYG) scheme is important. Section 4 provides a numerical example, 
which illustrates annual changes in the system’s financial position by means of an income 
statement for an already-functioning system. The paper ends with the concluding 
comments, and three appendices. The first of these is a glossary. The second one gives a 
brief picture on how disability benefits are treated within the NDC framework and its 
relation with minimum pension benefits, while the third one provides the technicalities of 
the model, which makes it possible to integrate disability and minimum pension benefits 
within the NDC framework. 
2.-MEASURING ASSETS AND LIABILITIES IN SOCIAL SECURITY 
SCHEMES: MAIN APPROACHES AND LITERATURE REVIEW.   
Social security pension schemes (SSSs, see Appendix 1)) are considered as 
contributory schemes because they are mainly financed by employer and employee 
contributions and /or earmarked taxes. The main social benefit payable in cash is the 
pension provision for retirees. However, others may be entitled to pensions, for example 
widows and the permanently disabled (see Appendix 1).  
Generally speaking, the payment of a specified number, or amount, of contributions 
creates a valid expectation that an individual or household will receive benefits based on 
those contributions made. These expectations may be strengthened by communications 
regarding personal details of estimated future benefits such as the “Social Security 
Statement” in USA (Armour, 2018) or the “Orange Envelop” in Sweden (Sundén, 2012) 
to name just a couple of examples5.  
As far as measuring the liabilities and assets for SSSs is concerned, there are four 
approaches, three of them are reasonably well-known; but another one is relatively 
unknown even for most pension experts. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the 
approaches analyzed below. 
2.1.-Closed group without future accruals (CG). 
Under this approach, the plan’s liabilities are equal to the present value of all 
expected future benefits to pensioners and all accrued rights of current affiliates. Accrued 
pension rights are due to already paid social contributions by current workers and 
remaining pension entitlements of existing pensioners. 
Assets include the amount of the buffer fund of the SSS if it were the case. Some schemes 
accumulate assets as a reserve in case liquidity or other adversities occur or to stabilize 
future contribution rates due to population ageing.  
The liability determined under this approach is called the accrued-to-date pension liability 
(ADL), and it can be interpreted as the amount of resources that has to be set aside today 
in order to finance all the pension rights that have been earned up to a given year (see 
Appendix 1). Although the pension system is assumed to be closed and given that 
pensions in payment are estimated in present value terms, from the actuarial perspective, 
it is necessary to take into account the number of years elapsed between the highest age 
to which it is possible to survive and the youngest cohort of pensioners.     
                                                 
5 The paper by Regúlez-Castillo and Vidal-Meliá (2012) provides a brief summary of information on 
Sweden, Chile, Germany, the United Kingdom, Finland, the United States, France, Japan and Canada 
concerning the most important elements included in the annual individual statement sent to contributors. 
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Table 1: Measuring liabilities (and assets) in (contributory) social security schemes: Summary (part 1) 
Approach 
Time horizon (valuation period) Number of new 
cohorts of 
contributors 
included 
Projections 
(explicit) 
Suitable for… 
Applied to… System Actuarial perspective 
Closed group 
without future 
accruals (CG) 
Zero, the system is assumed 
to be closed. 
Pensions in payment are 
estimated in present value 
terms. Years elapsed between 
the highest age to which it is 
possible to survive and the 
youngest cohort of pensioners. 
Zero. No 
Fully-funded DC 
schemes or PAYG 
schemes when the 
decision is made to 
cease it 
immediately. 
(Eurostat, 2011).  
Closed group 
with future 
accruals 
(CGFA) 
Years elapsed between the 
retirement age and the 
youngest cohort of 
contributors. 
Future and current pensions in 
payment are estimated in 
present value terms. Years 
elapsed between the highest 
age to which it is possible to 
survive and the youngest 
cohort of contributors. 
Zero, the system is 
considered as if it 
were in operation 
until the last 
contributor dies. 
No 
Fully-funded DB 
schemes or PAYG 
schemes when no 
new entrants are 
allowed. 
Hybrid Open 
group (HOG)  
An arbitrary time period 
corresponding to the allowed 
number of new cohorts of 
contributors (from 50 to 75 
years).  
Years elapsed between the 
highest age to which it is 
possible to survive and the 
youngest cohort of contributors 
plus the arbitrary time period. 
An arbitrary number 
(from 50 to 75). The 
system is considered 
as if it were 
functioning until the 
last contributor of the 
last cohort of entrants 
assumed as a 
contributor dies. 
Yes, it is necessary 
to make explicit 
projections of 
economic, financial 
and demographic 
variables 
PAYG schemes 
when only a limited 
number of new 
cohorts of entrants 
are allowed. 
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Table 1: Measuring liabilities and assets in contributory social security schemes: Summary (part 2) 
Approach 
Time horizon (valuation period) Number of new 
cohorts of 
contributors 
included 
Projections 
(explicit) 
Suitable for 
Applied to… System Actuarial perspective 
Open group 
(PG) 
An arbitrary time period from 
75-95 years to infinite 
Under a cash flow approach 
coincides with the system time 
horizon  
An arbitrary number 
from 75-95 years to 
infinite. It is assumed 
an ongoing basis for 
the scheme. 
Yes, it is necessary 
to make explicit 
projections of 
economic, financial 
or demographic 
variables 
PAYG and Partially 
funded schemes. 
(EC, 2018); (BOT, 
2018); (AAD, 
2017); (OSFIC, 
2018) 
“Swedish” open 
group (SOG) 
Valuation formulas consider 
only pensioners and 
contributors at the valuation 
date, but… 
The use of the expected time 
between payment of 
contributions and receipt of 
pensions (turnover duration, 
TD), and other assumptions, 
makes this approach equivalent 
to a perpetual time horizon. 
Equivalent to an 
infinite number of 
cohorts. 
There is no need for 
explicit projections. 
It is assumed that 
the system's rules 
and the economic 
and demographic 
conditions 
prevailing at the 
time of the valuation 
remain constant. 
PAYG schemes, 
especially for 
NDCs. (TSPS, 
2018)  
Source: Own 
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Starting in 2017, EU regulations require all Member States to disclose ADL using a 
standard actuarial cost method and common assumptions, both for SSSs and for unfunded 
defined benefit (DB) schemes (see Appendix 1) covering civil servants (Eurostat, 2010).  
These pension liabilities are not required to be included in the government’s core national 
accounts, but they have to be disclosed in a supplementary table, referred to as Table 29.  
This methodology may provide relevant information for pension systems financed using 
a full advance funding financing method (see Appendix 1), but the CG approach does not 
allow for the assessment of the financial sustainability (see Appendix 1) of SSSs, which 
are typically financed on a pay-as-you-go/partially funded basis (see Appendix 1).  
Large pension entitlements do not necessarily mean unsustainable pension schemes, and 
similarly, small pension entitlements do not mean that the respective pension schemes are 
fiscally stable in the long term (Eurostat, 2011). As Stavrakis (2018) states, if the ADL 
figures, which by nature are of a very large size, are disclosed alone without sufficient 
and proper explanation, or without complementary information, they could be easily 
misused or misinterpreted by the media and other external users, creating an unwarranted 
negative public opinion or perception of the SSSs. 
Wiener and Stokoe (2018) conclude that the use of the ADL is problematic. It is not only 
potentially misleading but may encourage “accounting arbitrage”, where countries are 
incentivised to structure systems in certain ways to reduce the value placed on pension 
liabilities. In short, it can be said that ADLs capture (in an unsuitable way) only one side 
of a pension scheme’s balance sheet which is considered from a Social Security 
Administration's point of view, the most valuable instrument for reporting the system’s 
financial status (Vidal-Meliá et al., 2018).  
2.2.-Closed group with future accruals (CGFA). 
The system’s liabilities are equal to the present value of all expected future 
benefits to beneficiaries and all accrued and future rights of current contributors 
(affiliates). Assets include the amount of the existing reserve from the pension system 
(i.e., any investable assets) and the present value of future contributions with respect to 
future benefits of current affiliates. 
To a large extent, this approach is in line with IPSASB, 2019. According to this 
accounting standard for the public sector, an entity shall recognize a liability for a social 
benefit scheme when the entity has a present obligation for an outflow of resources that 
results from a past event. Similarly, IPSASB, 2017b, indicates that assets are resources 
controlled by an entity as a result of a past event. This definition is consistent with those 
used by other accounting standard setters, such as the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB). Given that a past event is required before assets and liabilities are 
recognized, as will be seen later in this paper, the open group approach is ruled out in 
measuring the assets and liabilities (Mason, 2018). 
The definition of the CGFA corresponds to the situation where the SSS continues its 
existence until the last contributor dies, while no new entrants are allowed; both the future 
contribution of existing members and their new rights are therefore allowed under current 
rules. Since future and current pensions in payment are estimated in present value terms, 
from an actuarial point of view, the real valuation period comprises the number of years 
elapsed between the highest age to which it is possible to survive and the youngest 
generation of contributors. 
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CG approaches are suitable for fully-funded schemes, however its application to PAYG 
schemes always produce under-funding and are not reflective of prospective funding for 
plans relying on future contribution financing on an ongoing basis (Drouin et al., 2018). 
Some international organizations and several authors (ISSA-ILO, 2016; IAA, 2013 and 
2018, D’Ambrogi-Ola and Brown, 2018) have criticized the use of CG approaches when 
they are not consistent with the financing method adopted by the SSS. They recommend 
to the SS institution to disclose, in a supplementary note, alternative calculations in 
coherence with its financing approach.   
2.3.-Open group (OG). 
The system’s liabilities include the present value of all current beneficiaries and 
contributors to the SSS and the contributions and benefits of new affiliates under current 
rules; the range of options extends from including only children not yet in the labor force, 
to an infinite perspective. Usually, an arbitrary time period is chosen (75-95 years) and 
the methodology is applied over that period.  
This approach can be used to determine whether a SSS’s buffer fund (if any) in 
combination with future contributions (which together comprise the system’s assets) is 
expected to be sufficient to pay for all future benefit expenditures (the system’s 
liabilities).  
This approach is widely used by SS administrations and other related public institutions. 
The actuarial balance approach (US AB)7 used in the United States for its Old-Age, 
Survivor and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds (BOT, 2018), the Japanese “finite 
period of financial equilibrium” method (JAM) applied for the National Pension and 
Employees’ Pension Insurance (AAD, 2017), the Canadian actuarial valuation report 
(CAVR) on the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP), (OSFIC, 2018), and the Ageing Working 
Group of the Economy Policy Committee (the “AWG”) pension reporting (EC, 2018) are 
undertaken based on this OG approach.  
Partially funded systems, as well as pay-as-you-go ones, represent social contracts where, 
in any given year, current contributors allow the use of their contributions to pay current 
beneficiaries’ benefits. As a result, such social contracts create claims for current and past 
contributors to the contributions of future contributors. The proper assessment of the 
financial sustainability of a PAYG or partially funded system by means of its balance 
sheet should take into account these claims. (AAA, 1998; OSFIC, 2018; Drouin et al., 
2018). 
The ABS can be produced using open-group projections. The projections may be based 
on either a cash-flow approach or a cohort-based approach (Drouin et al., 2018). 
Under a cash-flow approach, future in-flows and out-flows of the system are projected 
over a long period (at least 75 years), independently of the cohorts of contributors to 
which they relate. It means that in the last year of the projection period, the latest cohorts 
of affiliates included in the projection will have paid contributions for some time but the 
benefits to which they will eventually be entitled are not entirely paid. It also means that 
there exists a remaining liability at the end of the projection period (pension rights 
accumulated on the last day of the projection period that are not yet paid) that is not part 
of the ABS.  
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for a brief definition of the several actuarial reports (US, Canada, Japan and pension 
reporting). 
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Under a cohort-based approach (labeled as Hybrid Open group (HOG) in Table 1), the 
ABS includes all cash flows related to a certain number of cohorts (e.g. contributors and 
beneficiaries at the valuation date plus, for example, 75 cohorts of future contributors). It 
means that the cash flows must be projected until the time the last benefit payment of the 
last beneficiary of these 75 cohorts of future contributors is made, consequently, from an 
actuarial point of view, the real valuation period comprises the number of years elapsed 
between the highest age to which it is possible to survive and the youngest cohort of 
contributors plus the arbitrary time period. This approach can be used to assess the 
financial sustainability of PAYG schemes when only a limited number of new cohort 
entrants are allowed.  
Finally, several international associations such as the International Federation of 
Accountants (IPSASB, 2017a, b and c), the International Actuarial Association (IAA, 
2013 and 2018) and the International Social Security Association (ISSA and ILO, 2016) 
also recognize that the assessment of the long-term sustainability of SSSs should take into 
account future benefits as well as future revenue.  
2.4.-The “Swedish” open group (SOG). 
Another methodology to be taken into account to measure the assets and liabilities 
for a SSS is the one used by the Swedish authorities since 2001 (TSPS, 2002). In Sweden 
there is a notional defined contribution (NDC) pension scheme in force, a special type of 
PAYG pension system8.  
SOG is based on the CG method that has been modified to make it equivalent to OG. It 
can be considered "open group" at any particular year t because to value the system’s 
assets and liabilities, it takes new entrants into account and assumes that there will be 
contributions to meet liabilities, but valuation formulas consider only pensioners and 
contributors at the valuation date9.  
A central accounting principle of this approach is that the system’s assets and liabilities 
are valued on the basis of events and transactions that are verifiable at the time of 
valuation, with no need for explicit projections. It is assumed that the system's rules and 
the economic and demographic conditions prevailing at the time of the valuation remain 
constant.  
As we will see later, the value of the contribution flow (the contribution asset) is estimated 
by multiplying the current contribution revenue of the system by the expected time 
between payment of contributions and receipt of pensions (turnover duration, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇), and 
this could be interpreted as equivalent to discounting an assumed perpetual constant flow 
of contributions by the inverse of the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. This involves an OG approach with a perpetual 
time horizon. 
This way of measuring the system’s assets and liabilities has a high degree of 
transparency and needs no complicated projections of economic, financial or 
demographic variables, which could easily have a biased effect on the sustainability and 
solvency indicators. This approach is suitable to introduce automatic balance mechanisms 
                                                 
8 The papers by Qi et al., (2018) and Palmer and Könberg (2019), to name just a couple, as well as TSPS 
(2018), are good sources for the interested reader in the real aspects of the NDC Swedish pension system: 
the financial stability, factors influencing the adequacy of benefits, and its interplay with other components 
of the pension system or its effect on prolonging the working life of the affiliates.   
9 PAYG systems bear a fundamental risk related to the demographic variable "new entrants" and to their 
future contribution capacity (Melis and Trudda, 2012). This issue clearly goes beyond the limits of our 
study. 
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(ABMs, see Appendix 1), given that the possibly endless debates as to the accuracy of 
long term projections are avoided. 
2.4.1.-Literature review on the use of the ABS to assess the solvency of SSSs. 
Based on the SOG approach, several papers have explored the use of actuarial balance 
sheets (ABS) to assess the solvency of SSSs. The ABS can be defined as a financial 
statement listing the pension system's obligations to contributors and pensioners at a 
particular date, with the amounts of the various assets (financial and mainly through 
contributions) that underwrite those commitments. As Boado-Penas et al. (2008) have  
pointed out, the main aim of the ABS is to give a true and fair view (TFV)10 of the pension 
system’s assets and liabilities at the beginning and end of the fiscal year and, by 
comparing these figures, to determine the change in net worth. It can be said that the 
pension system is solvent at the valuation date when the relation between the assets and 
liabilities of the system is equal to or greater than 1. 
From a theoretical perspective, Settergren and Mikula (2005) develop the main principles 
for reporting the financial position of retirement NDC schemes within a balance sheet. 
Boado-Penas et al. (2008) develop the main entries to compile the actuarial balance sheet 
for a DB PAYG scheme. Vidal-Melia and Boado-Penas (2013) obtain the analytical 
properties of the contribution asset and endorsed its soundness as a measure of the assets 
of a PAYG scheme. Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá (2014) develop the theoretical basis 
for drawing up a “Swedish” type ABS for a DB PAYG scheme with retirement and 
disability benefits while Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) propose a “Swedish” ABS for an 
NDC scheme with disability and minimum pension benefits. Vidal-Meliá et al. (2018) 
present a social insurance accounting model for an NDC scheme combining retirement 
and long-term care (LTC) contingencies. The model also includes an income statement 
to determine any change in the system's net worth. 
From an applied perspective, the annual reports of the Swedish pension system are the 
main references. However, some researchers based on the (actuarial) balance sheet 
approach have presented applications to several countries such as Japan, New Zealand, 
Finland, Spain, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and Belgium.  
Takayama (2005) explains the 2004 pension reforms in Japan using the balance sheet 
approach to analyse the implications for the Japanese economy. Rashbrooke (2008) 
explores the application of actuarial accounting methodology developed by the Swedish 
authorities to the New Zealand flat rate social security pension. Lassila and Valkonen 
(2008) apply the Swedish balance mechanism, based on the ratio of assets to liabilities 
emerging from the balance sheet, to the Finnish private-sector earnings-related pension 
system and simulate the future with stochastic population projections and asset yields. 
Boado-Penas et al. (2008) provide the first estimate of the actuarial balance of the Spanish 
contributory pension system for the old-age contingency, based on official data, whereas 
Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009), aimed at showing the usefulness of automatic balance 
mechanisms, present a comparison between the official balance sheet for the Swedish 
notional account system and the balance sheet for the Spanish contributory pension 
system. Finally, Vidal-Meliá (2014) compiles two actuarial balance models for the 
Spanish public retirement pension system at 1-1-2010 and 31-12-2010 and then compare 
them with those for Sweden and the USA. 
                                                 
10 In the Swedish pension system, the financial report (ABS) is audited in accordance with the Regulations 
on Annual Reporting of the Financial Position and Development of the Earnings Related to the Old Age 
Pension System (2002:135) (TSPS, 2018). 
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For Canada, with the aim of making a comparison with the official actuarial valuation 
report of the CPP, Billig and Ménard (2013) make a practical adaptation of the 
methodology used to compile the Swedish ABS. Metzger (2018) uses the Swedish ABS 
methodology to assess the fiscal sustainability of the Swiss old-age pension system 
(AHV). For the German statutory pension insurance, Metzger (2019) estimates a balance 
sheet for the years 2005 to 2014 considering old-age, disability and survivors’ pension 
entitlements. Finally, Alonso-García and Devolder (2019) apply a continuous 
overlapping generations (OLG) model to assess the solvency of a generic NDC scheme 
for the population of Belgium. Solvency in their setting represents a longitudinal 
perspective as it compares the liabilities towards all participants of the scheme 
(contributors and retirees) with a contribution asset, that is, the actuarial balance sheet as 
developed in Settergren and Mikula (2005). 
It is worth mentioning that some of the papers quoted presenting applications for the 
above-mentioned countries do not develop the theoretical basis for making the 
application, especially those including disability and survivors’ pension entitlements and 
non-contributory benefits. Indeed, some authors warn us that the exercise of compiling 
the balance sheet should be viewed simply as an illustration. 
3.-THE ACCOUNTING MODEL 
This section presents the main characteristics of a social insurance accounting 
model for an NDC scheme including retirement, disability and minimum pension benefits 
(MPB) for both contingencies. Special attention is paid to the income statement and the 
specificities for a (fictional) already-functioning NDC scheme. This section also offers 
reasons why presenting the income statement of an already-functioning NDC (PAYG) 
scheme is important.  
It seems difficult to hide the real importance of including a disability benefit in an NDC 
scheme. Disability Insurance should be an integral part of SSSs; given that it is much 
more than just a retirement program. This benefit protects afiliates in case they can no 
longer support themselves due to a severe and long-term disability. 
It is worth highlighting that in most developed countries a dramatic increase in the 
disability beneficiaries has been observed (Autor and Duggan, 2006; OECD, 2019). There 
are a variety of reasons explaining this fact: population changes and ageing trends (CRS, 
2018); economic factors, including labour market fluctuations and the availability and 
attractiveness of work (Benítez-Silva et al., 2010); lower transaction costs on disability 
applications (Foote et al., 2019), movement from or to other social welfare schemes 
(Lindner, 2016; Borghans, et al., 2014); changes to the prevalence of disability, or 
different types of disability, within the population; increasing the normal retirement age 
(Li, 2018), changes to the standard medical definition and diagnosis practices (García-
Gómez and Gielen, 2018); and changes to qualification criteria including means testing 
(Low and Pistaferri, 2015; Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2016) and medical assessment. 
Changes in education levels also play an important role in future trends in Social security 
disability (Michaud et al., 2018), and the long term effects of education on economic 
outcomes, such as the receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and the early 
claiming of Social Security retirement benefits (Venti and Wise, 2005) 
In short, the issue of disability insurance has multiple implications for society, which go 
beyond the objective of this paper, but it is not an exaggeration to say that disability costs 
need to be closely monitored, and our paper covers this existing gap in the NDCs 
literature. 
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The study of how disability benefits are treated within the NDC framework and its 
relation with minimum pension benefits (Appendix 2), shows there are several issues to 
be improved: discontinuities in benefit levels occurred when disability benefits are 
converted into retirement benefits at the ordinary retirement age (Sweden), disability 
pensions are converted into old age pensions according to NDC rules, but the old-age 
pension cannot be lower than the granted disability benefit (Latvia); in Norway, disability 
pensioners are partially exempted from life age adjustments, so the “system” gives 
incentives to become disabled before obtaining the retirement pension. In Italy the 
formula used to calculate the disability pension does not provide a clear link between 
benefits and contributions and also includes the possibility of paying survivor benefits. 
Generally speaking, in the countries analysed, a lack of transparency can be observed in 
the redistribution embedded in the defined benefit formula used to calculate disability 
benefits. The specific life expectancy of the disabled people by age is not used either to 
compute the disability benefit, which is surprising from an actuarial point of view. Giving 
that the NDC pension operates on a PAYG basis but mimicking a FDC scheme, the idea 
of using the specific mortality for disabled people comes naturally to actuarial thinking 
as a way of improving the link between benefits and contributions. 
The paper by Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) designed a Swedish type ABS for an NDC 
scheme with disability and minimum pension benefits. The way disability is treated in 
their proposal has several advantages to overcome some of the above mentioned 
drawbacks. Briefly, it makes it easier to integrate both contingencies into a coherent NDC 
framework, the formula for calculating the disability benefits is embedded into the general 
formula for determining the retirement benefits, and the integrated system is financially 
sound and sustainable over time. Furthermore, it introduces redistribution in a very 
transparent manner and it allows the sponsor (the state) to take into account trends in 
disability, longevity and other sources of risk in “pricing” benefits more effectively. 
The above mentioned paper on the pure NDC model shows that in a steady and well 
balanced (unrealistic) state the system's total liabilities match perfectly with the system's 
total contribution asset. The two integrated contingencies (retirement and disability) are 
in financial equilibrium. They also included a numerical example that shed light on the 
real applicability of their proposal and the impact of introducing the MPB on the ABS. 
However, they did not describe the more realistic case for an already-functioning NDC 
scheme nor did they develop the income statement which fully explains the reasons 
behind the changes in the system’s solvency by type of benefit. The technical details of 
the proposed model are not developed either. 
The income statement gives a full explanation of the reasons for changes in the system’s 
solvency, in our model the reasons are also detailed by type of benefit. In this type of 
pension scheme, changes in net worth are affected by economic and demographic factors, 
and financial markets if the system has a reserve fund. Usually, the main factor in the 
short term would be growth in employment and contribution basis, whereas in the long 
term, demographic factors would be by far more important.  
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3.1.-The “Swedish” actuarial balance sheet for a (fictional) already-functioning 
NDC scheme combining retirement and disability contingencies with a MPB. 
Very briefly, the main features of the proposed scheme are the following: 
There are two types of pensioners: retirement pensioners and disability pensioners. The 
affiliates are the active workers, who contribute to both retirement and disability 
contingencies. The disability is linked to working ages. There is a defined contribution 
rate (fixed over time), 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎, to cover both contingencies. 
Pension contributions are tracked in accounts which earn interest on accumulated 
contributions equal to the change in the covered wage bill growth11 plus the so-called 
“survivor dividend”. These inheritance gains are made up of the account balances of 
participants (not disabled) who do not survive until retirement and which are distributed 
to the accounts of the surviving contributors on a birth cohort basis (Boado-Penas and 
Vidal-Meliá, 2014; Arnold-Gaille et al., 2016; Vidal-Meliá et al., 2016; Knell, 2018).  
The amount accredited in the notional account is an accumulation of the contributions 
made by the deceased, the corresponding survivor dividends that were distributed and the 
returns generated over the participant's working life. 
The age giving entitlement to retirement pension, 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴, is fixed (in the theoretical 
model), so early retirement is not considered. In the numerical example this assumption 
is relaxed, there is an age interval to getting retirement.  
We also assume that participants’ lives last 𝜔𝜔 − 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 periods, where 𝜔𝜔 is the maximum 
lifespan and 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 is the earliest age of entry into the system.  
It is assumed that the ages for eligibility to receive disability benefits are to be found in 
the age interval [𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 1,𝜔𝜔], and workers acquire insured status from the first day of 
employment, with no prior contribution requirement or waiting period. We assume that 
disability is an absorbing state and that once disabled, an individual remains disabled for 
the rest of his/her life. It is considered that the only reason for a disabled worker’s benefit 
to terminate is through the death of the pensioner. Conversions or recoveries are not taken 
into account. 
In short, the initial amount of the benefit depends on several elements, the most important 
being the pension balance accumulated at retirement or at the time of disability and the 
minimum pension benefit. However, there are other elements that also matter: the 
expected mortality of the cohort in the year the contributor reaches retirement, the 
disability incidence rates by age, the expected mortality of disabled persons, and a 
notional imputed future indexation rate, 𝛼𝛼 (see Technical Appendix). 
In practice, the supplement to the MPB would be paid only if the beneficiary has assets 
below a specific maximum, i.e. the system demands an asset test (see Appendix 1). 
With the described rules of the pension system, an ABS for a hypothetical already-
functioning NDC scheme combining retirement and disability contingencies with a MPB 
can be compiled as shown in Table 2. 
As depicted in Table 2, the two contingencies are disclosed and the commitments deriving 
from non-contributory rights (NCRs) are accounted for. This ABS splits the system into 
two parts: the actuarial part (pure NDC) and the redistributive part, which includes the 
                                                 
11 Another notional rate could be used: the income growth per capita, the GDP growth, the overall 
contribution revenue growth, etc. 
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assets and liabilities originating from NCRs, but for the sake of brevity the ABS is shown 
as a whole. 
The right-hand side of Table 2 shows the liabilities and the sponsor support (capital) of 
the ABS. 
The liabilities to pensioners for retirement, Pen_(R), and disability, Pen_(D), can be 
defined as the present value of the amount of all the benefits in payment stemming from 
contributory rights at the valuation date of the balance sheet. The interest rate for 
discounting liabilities to pensioners is taken to be the growth rate of the covered wage 
bill (𝐺𝐺). 
Table 2: The ABS for an already-functioning NDC scheme combining retirement and 
disability contingencies with a MPB. 
ASSETS LIABILITIES AND SPONSOR SUPPORT (CAPITAL) 
Financial (and Real) Assets: FA Financial liabilities: FD Sponsor Support: Ss 
Contribution Asset for Retirement: CA_(R) 
Liability to Contributors for Retirement: 
Con_(R) 
Liability to Pensioners for Retirement: 
Pen_(R) 
Public Contribution Asset: PCA_(R) or  
Buffer Fund for Retirement: BF_(R) 
Liability to Contributors for Retirement: 
Con_(R)_NCR 
Liability to Pensioners for Retirement: 
Pen_(R) 
Contribution Asset for Disability: CA_(D) 
Liability to Contributors for Disability:  
Con_(D) 
Liability to Pensioners for Disability:  
Pen_(D) 
Public Contribution Asset: PCA_(D) or  
Buffer Fund for Disability: BF_(R) 
Liability to Contributors for Disability: 
Con_(D)_NCR 
NCR Liability to Pensioners for Disability: 
Pen_(D)_NCR: 
Accumulated deficit: Ad_(R+D) Accumulated surplus: As_(R+D) 
Actuarial Losses for the period: L_(R+D) Actuarial profit (gains) for the period: P_(R+D) 
Total Assets Total Liabilities 
Source: Own based on Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) and Vidal-Melia et al. (2018). 
As far as the liabilities to pensioners for disability are concerned, and contrary to the 
Swedish model, we do not apply “pension reclassification”. If we were to consider those 
disabled people who reach retirement age as retirement pensioners, the apparent liability 
to pensioners for retirement (disability) would increase (decrease) noticeably.  
Given that the system provides a minimum pension benefit for both contingencies, this 
side also shows the liability to pensioners for retirement, Pen_(R) _NCR, and disability, 
Pen_(D) _NCR, caused by NCRs. The liability is calculated the same way as in the 
actuarial part. It is worth remenbering that if the amount of the initial pension (retirement 
or disability) is below a minimum value, the amount is supplemented up to the minimum 
pension benefit. 
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The liabilities to contributors for retirement, Con_(R), and disability, Con_(D), are 
equivalent to the notional capital accumulated in the participants' accounts (formed by the 
contributions made by participants, plus the return deriving from the notional rate of 
interest credited to those accounts plus the survivor dividend). 
Depending on the criteria chosen to quantify the NCRs of the contributors (Vidal-Meliá 
et al., 2018), there could be two aditional items presented on the balance sheet, liabilitiy 
to contributors for retirement, Con_(R)_NCR, and disability, Con_(D)_NCR, due to 
NCRs.  
If the “Swedish” principle was applied, whereby the liabilities of the pension system are 
valued mainly on the basis of events and transactions that are verifiable at the time of 
valuation with no need for explicit projections, the liability to contributors for retirement 
and disability due to the NCRs should be zero; i.e. Con_(R)_NCR = Con_(D)_NCR = 
0. Instead, if it were to make explicit projections, by taking into account the future wage 
development, the inclusion of a MPB would imply the valuation of the accrued minimum 
benefit by means of the prospective measure by the forecasted method. As a result, these 
liabilities, caused by NCRs, could have a positive value at the valuation date. 
Financial liabilities, FD, are liabilities on the actuarial balance sheet resulting from a 
(temporary) accumulation of treasury deficits. In some countries, for instance in the USA, 
the pension system is not allowed to borrow under any circumstance, whereas in others, 
Spain is one of them, the system increases its financial debt to pay for the scheduled 
benefits.  
Sponsor support or Capital, SS, this item is the counterpart of the buffer fund 
corresponding to the sponsor (the state in a public plan); this allows for possible annual 
shortfalls in the system's income to be dealt with by selling financial assets. In reality, 
this is a security mechanism; the sponsor offers a certain protection against the financial 
instability due to possible annual shortfalls in the system's income.      
The entries shown on the right-hand side of Table 2 also include the accumulated surplus, 
As_(R+D), and the actuarial profits for the (annual) period, P_(R+D). The accumulated 
surplus is the pension system’s “accumulated gain” or net worth, which is owned by the 
system's sponsor, in this case the state.  The annual gain is the difference between the 
change in the value of the assets and the actuarial liabilities; the difference should be 
positive. Both entries could be reported by contingency.  
The left-hand side (or assets side) of Table 2 lists the main entries that can appear in the 
ABS.  
The contribution asset for retirement, CA_(R), and for Disability, CA_(D). As stated in 
the previous section, in PAYG systems, the contribution flow is considered as the 
principal asset. The Swedish concept of the value of the (future) contribution flow is 
expressed as the contribution asset: the maximum level of liabilities that would have 
existed on the last day of the accounting period if the age-related income distribution, 
age-related mortality and disability, the size of the contribution (tax) base, the structure 
of pensiones and the pension system rules were never changed (Boado-Penas and Vidal-
Meliá, 2013). Once the process for obtaining the system’s turnover duration has been 
developed (see the technical appendix), the contribution asset is simple to calculate: it is 
the product of the size of the flow per time unit, which in practice is a year, and the 
expected time between payment of contributions and receipt of pensions, the so called 
turnover duration (TD).  
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In this model, the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 for the system could be interpreted as the number of years expected 
to elapse before the committed liabilities to contributors and pensioners for retirement 
and disability are completely renewed at the current contribution level. Each monetary 
unit enters the system as if it were paid by a contributor of 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 years and remains within 
the contribution liability until retirement age is reached (pay-in). It is then received by a 
pensioner aged 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 years (pay-out). (See details in Technical Appendix) 
This side could include a buffer fund or reserve fund. This entry is the value of the stock 
of financial assets owned by the system, FA. The funds' purpose is to compensate for 
temporary deficits in pension contributions in relation to pension disbursements. This 
asset could result from an accumulation of treasury surpluses or simply for the sake of 
liquidity resulting from an extraordinary contribution made by the sponsor: Ss  
Since the system provides MPBs, its solvency and transparency needs to be preserved by 
including an asset counterpart to underwrite the liabilities caused by NCRs. To do this, 
and depending on the approach adopted (Pérez-Salamero et al., 2017; Vidal-Meliá et al., 
2018) two additional entries can appear: a special type of public contribution asset: 
PCA_(D) and PCA_(R), or a buffer fund: BF_(D) and BF_(R), financed from general 
government revenues. It is important to note that disability benefits, survivor benefits and 
guaranteed minimum pensions are excluded from Swedish accounting because they are 
not part of the NDC system but are financed separately, basically using general tax 
revenue (TSPS, 2018). 
We can also find on this side the accumulated deficit, Ad_(R+D), and the actuarial losses 
for the period, L_(R+D). The accumulation of actuarial losses in each period determines 
the value of the accumulated shortfall at the date of the balance sheet, and the “losses in 
each period” represents the difference between the variations of the value of the liabilities 
and assets for the period, the opposed concept of accumulated surplus. The actuarial loss 
is equivalent to the increase in the accumulated Deficit or the reduction in the 
accumulated Surplus, depending on the situation.  
Finally, the net worth is a balancing item that stems from valuing assets and liabilities 
(including Sponsor support) according to the accounting principles used on the balance 
sheet date. Net worth can be positive, negative, or zero, and it is equal, to the accumulated 
surplus plus the profit for the period or, where appropriate, minus the loss for the period. 
By the same token, net worth could be equal to the accumulated shortfall plus the actuarial 
losses for the period or, where applicable, minus the profit for the period. 
The changes in the balance sheet account records which are the changes in the value of 
assets and liabilities in the course of the accounting period and the aggregated amounts 
recorded in the various accumulation accounts; in fact, this is the definition of the income 
statement which quantifies the solvency changes by means of the difference in the net 
worth of the system. 
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3.2.-The income statement for a fictional already-functioning NDC scheme 
combining retirement and disability contingencies with a MPB. 
In this subsection we develop the main entries for the income statement for a 
hypothetical already-functioning NDC scheme combining retirement and disability 
contingencies with a MPB. This profit and loss account follows the model published by 
the Swedish authorities, but some modifications need to be introduced in order to adapt 
it to the specific NDC model proposed in our paper. Our proposed income statement 
incorporates an important item which the benchmark model should include to better 
compute the annual change in the system's net worth.  
It should be noted that the “Swedish approach” is an adaptive methodology with an annual 
review process, therefore it is not prospective or predictive, and the assumption that the 
system's rules and the economic and demographic conditions prevailing at the time of the 
valuation remain constant is fully coherent.  
As anyone can easily see, the ABS and the income statement are closely linked. In fact, 
the “net profit” for a period can be computed without an income statement. The simplest 
manner to determine the change in the system's net worth is by comparing the opening 
and closing ABS; but there is a significant lack of detail.  
The proposed income statement structure is shown in Table 3, in which for simplicity’s 
sake it is assumed that NCRs are totally guaranteed by the sponsor, the system's 
administration costs are financed by general taxation and that inheritance gains arising 
and distributed and are perfectly matched within the year.   
Table 3 exhibits on the left side changes in assets, which are interpreted in the following 
manner: A negative item (-) decreases the asset and a positive item (+) increases it, by the 
amount shown. On the right side, we find the changes in pension liabilities; its associated 
items need to be interpreted in the following manner: A negative item (-) decreases the 
pension liability and a positive item (+) increases it, by the amount shown. 
Table 3: The Income Statement for a NDC scheme combining Retirement and 
Disability contingencies with a MPB for the period. 
FUND ASSETS (Changes) LIABILITIES (Changes) 
Pension contributions: C New pension credit: C 
Sponsor contributions for NCRs: SC Recognition of NCRs: R 
Pension disbursements: - PT Pension disbursements: - PT 
Net return on funded capital: D Indexation: I 
CONTRIBUTION ASSET (Changes) Value of change in life expectancy: 𝛿𝛿e 
Value of change in contribution revenue: 
𝛿𝛿C Value of change in discount rate: 𝛿𝛿G 
Value of change in turnover duration: 
𝛿𝛿TD NET GAIN/LOSS 
Total Debit Side Total Credit Side 
Source: Own. 
Beginning on the left side first, the annual change in fund assets or buffer fund is the 
result of adding the income from all types of contributions to the return on funded capital 
and deducting the payments for retirement and disability pensions. In this scheme there 
could be two types of contributions, firstly, the ordinary one which is made by affiliates, 
and secondly the extraordinary one which is made by the sponsor to cover NCRs. 
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The extraordinary contribution (if necessary) for each new beneficiary is determined in 
the following way: in the event of disability or retirement, firstly the amount required for 
awarding the MPB is calculated using a gender-neutral annuity factor. This amount is 
then compared to the individual pension balance; if the amount calculated is less than the 
amount accredited in the notional account, the sponsor has to top up the difference12.  
Pension contributions are used to pay beneficiaries (disabled and retirees) in the same 
year. In practice, all pension contributions are paid and distributed monthly to the reserve 
fund. The surpluses or deficits that arise when pension contributions are greater or less 
than pension disbursements are absorbed by the buffer fund. Finally, the net return on 
funded capital includes dividends on assets held by public pension funds, financial assets 
are valued at their market price on the last trading day of the year. The net return on 
funded capital can be positive or negative depending on the situation of the financial 
markets. 
On the left side, we can also see the changes to the contribution asset broken down into 
contribution revenue and turnover duration. The value of the change in contribution 
revenue is the monetary value, in terms of how much more (or less) liability can be 
financed by a higher (or lower) level of contributions relative to the preceding year. 
The value of the change in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (volume of assets) is a combined effect from a variety of 
causes. This amount synthesizes into a single number a great deal of information about 
the system’s rules, the age distribution of the population, the age patterns of the labour 
supply and earnings, mortality (change in life expectancy) and disability rates (change in 
biometrics assumptions). 
The first item that we can see on the right side is the new pension credits. This accounting 
item should be identical to income from contributions; the equality between contributions 
paid and new pension credits is a key feature of a pure NDC scheme. In practice, both 
items could be slightly different due to operative reasons.   
The second item on this side is the so-called “recognition of NCRs”; apart from certain 
demographic and economic circumstances, its annual amount will depend on the criteria 
chosen to quantify the NCRs. Its countepart on the debit side is sponsor contributions for 
NCRs.  Both amounts should be perfectly matched and correspond to the redistributive 
part of the scheme. This entry would include the effect of legislative reforms affecting 
the minimum pension benefit level. This entry cannot be found in the benchmark model. 
The liability is reduced by the amount of pension expenses, given that pension payments 
are an amortization of the pension liability. On both sides of the income statement, the 
amount of the pension disbursements should coincide. 
Change in pension liabilities due to indexation of notional accounts and benefits in 
payment, I, are also accounted for. It is assumed that the indexation rules are the same for 
the actuarial part and for the benefits originated from NCRs. In our model the notional 
rate of return is the wage bill growth. If the system had implemented an ABM, and it were 
triggered because the balance ratio (see Appendix 1) fell below 1.0000, then the real 
indexation would be lower than the wage bill growth. 
The entry “Value of change in life expectancy”, 𝛿𝛿e, is due to the annual update of life 
expectancy. The increase in life expectancy over the past several decades has been 
striking and represents a key challenge for SSSs. This item is in coherence with the 
                                                 
12 This method is similar to that used in Chile for disability insurance (Edwards et al., 2015). In fact, the 
sponsor is the insurer of the system. 
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accounting principle of updating main data on an annual basis. It is important to 
accurately estimate the life expectancy for the two collectives: disabled and retired 
people. Mortality (life expectancy) for disabled people depends on the cause (e.g. accident 
versus sickness) and severity (partial versus total, temporary versus permanent) of 
disability (Plamondon, et al., 2002; Pitacco, 2014) 
To give a couple of examples, in Canada, mortality of disability beneficiaries is much 
greater than that of the general population. Mortality rates of disability beneficiaries aged 
50 to 64 in 2011 are on average six times higher than that of the general population. For 
a 50-year-old disability beneficiary, the level of mortality is about equal to that of an 
individual aged 75 in the general population (OSFIC, 2015).  In the US, the mortality rate 
for a female (male) disabled beneficiary is 4.3 (5.02) times that of a healthy annuitant. 
For a 50-year-old female (male) disability beneficiary, the level of mortality is almost 
equal to that of an individual aged 69 (72) in the population of healthy pensioners13 (SOA, 
2014).  
In short, disabled people have a lower life expectancy than active people, but the 
difference in longevity tends to decrease notably as the individuals increase in age.  
In contrast to the Swedish model, on the right side we have included another item known 
as the “value of change in the discount rate (𝐺𝐺)”, 𝛿𝛿G. The discount rate assumption is the 
most influential actuarial input affecting both funding ratios and contribution 
requirements (Chen and Matkin, 2017). In our model it does not affect the level of 
contributions but it is very important to value pensions in payment and to compute the 
balance ratio. Either way, its effect on the ABS would be dampened by using a 5-year 
moving average of the wage bill growth, or another reasonable form of smoothing. 
The main practical implication of the introduction of this item is that it would increase 
the volatility of the system’s results and could trigger a greater number of times the 
automatic balance mechanism. 
Finally, a net income or loss for the year is accounted for on the right side.  
From an analytical point of view, the change in net worth can be detailed as follows: 
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[1.] 
= 
�𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1
𝑆𝑆�������
𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎
� − �𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 − 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1
𝑆𝑆�������
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎
�
�������������������
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎
 
= 
𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆���
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆���𝐶𝐶𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆�𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎
���������������������������
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎
 
                                                 
13 Similar results can be found in other countries such as Norway, Sweden (Gjesdal et al., 2009). South 
Korea (Park et al., 2017), Belgium or Spain (Duran et al., 2016).     
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As depicted in formula [1.], the change in net worth can be determined in the simplest 
manner by comparing the system's assets and liabilities on two consecutive valuation 
dates. 
If 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 > 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆, the change in net worth is positive, i.e. the sum of the left side items 
exceeds the sum of the right side items in value, in short the system has actuarial profits 
for the period. 
 If 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 < 0 ⇒ 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆, the sum of the right side items exceeds the sum of the left side 
items, shows that the net wealth has been reduced, i.e. the system has actuarial losses for 
the period.  
If 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 = 0, the system’s net worth does not change. 
The changes in net worth can be broken down into three main items: 
1.- Change in fund/financial asset 
𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆  = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝑆𝑆𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 − 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆  [2.] 
Where, 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 : is the income from ordinary contributions; 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆: is the income from sponsor 
contributions for NCRs; 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆: is the total pension disbursements,  and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆 : is the 
net return on funded capital. 
2.-Change in contribution asset: 
𝛿𝛿 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆  = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆
− 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆 = 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆�𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆���
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
 
[3.] = 
�(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆 )  ∙ (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆)2 ����������������������
𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆
+ �(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆 )2 ∙ (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1𝑆𝑆 )�������������������
𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆
� 
If the approach adopted to back up the increase in liabilities due to the introduction of an 
MPB was the public contribution asset method, we would also need to take into account 
the annual change in public contribution asset. 
3.-Change in pension liability: 
𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝑁𝑁𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 − 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆�
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆�
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
 [4.] 
Where, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆: is the value of newly awarded NCRs; 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆: is the indexation effect; 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆: is 
the value of the change in the liability to pensioners due to changes in life expectancy: 
and 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆: is the value of the change in liability to pensioners due to changes in the discount 
rate.  
The value of the change in the liability to pensioners due to the updated information about 
the discount rate and the life expectancy can be expressed as follows: 
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𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃_(𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�������𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 − 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃_(𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�������
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎−𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎
= 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 
[5.] 
= 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃_(𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒)���������
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
− 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃_(𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖���������������������𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 +  𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃_(𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝐺𝐺)���������
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ
𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺
− 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃_(𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖���������������������
𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆
  
Finally, the income statement could easily be disaggregated by contingency, in formulas 
[1.] to [5.], we only need to change the superscript “S” by “R” or “D” where necessary. 
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 = 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 [6.] 
3.3.-Why the income statement of a hypothetical already-functioning NDC is 
important from a public accounting perspective. 
Now that we have presented the Income Statement for our model, we consider it 
appropriate to dedicate some space to explain its importance for PAYG pension systems 
(in general) and for NDCs schemes in particular. 
We are aware that the public sector’s financial reporting mechanisms do not have to 
coincide with those of the private sector given that the main objective of both systems is 
different. 
In the case of the public sector pension system, its principal objective is not as a profit 
making entity and as previously considered the pension and disability policies have 
multiple implications for society, which go beyond the objective of this paper. 
However, we are dealing with the pension contributions of individuals and there needs to 
be responsibility for the correct management of these sums, the sustainability of the 
system and the financial information reported should be useful to user’s needs, for future 
decision making. 
The above affirmation coincides with the standard setter objectives for the public sector, 
for example the IPSASB (2017c) set out the requirements for general purpose financial 
reports in the public sector and the public sector pension system clearly enters into the 
entities covered by their standards. 
The reporting of an Income Statement also coincides with the objectives of IPSAS 1 
Presentation of Financial Statements (IPSASB, 2017a) using accrual based accounting 
methods. This standard outlines that the objectives of general purpose financial reporting 
in the public sector should be to provide useful information for decision-making purposes 
and to demonstrate the accountability of the entity for the resources entrusted to it. 
The latter is very clear on the objective of the accountability of the resources in the 
pension scheme regardless of the public policy taken for contribution collection and its 
distribution. In order to accomplish this aim the standard mentions, among others, the 
provision of aggregate information that is useful in evaluating the entity’s performance 
in terms of service costs, efficiency and accomplishments. This would justify the 
preparation of an income statement. 
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IPSAS 1 (IPSASB, 2017a) states that, general purpose financial statements can also have 
a predictive role or a prospective role, providing information which is useful in predicting 
the level of resources required for continued operations, the resources that may be 
generated by continued operations and the associated risks and uncertainties14. The above 
distinctly covers the objective of reporting the sustainability and solvency of the pension 
system. 
The standard also considers that a complete set of financial statements will comprise of a 
statement of financial position which is what has been denoted to as the balance sheet; a 
statement of financial performance, referred to in our paper as an income statement; a 
statement of changes in net assets/equity; a cash flow statement; budgeted and actual 
amounts when the entity makes available its approved budget; notes to the accounts and 
comparative information for the preceding period. 
As already mentioned above, the inclusion of the Income Statement in our version uses 
the TSPS (2018) as a benchmark and extends the previous model developed by Pérez-
Salamero at al. (2017) and Vidal-Melia et al. (2018) by incorporating an Income 
Statement.  
The inclusion of an Income Statement into the published information relating to the Public 
Pension System of a country could improve the understanding of the information and also 
advance in the transparency of the system. Of course, the change in the net worth can be 
determined by calculating the difference in this item from the closing and opening 
Balance sheet for the reporting period but an Income statement shows a breakdown of 
that change in net worth during the period.  
In the public system model, the income statement has the role of identifying the changes 
over the period being reported. These changes are broken down into sub classifications 
and by contingencies, which enable us to distinguish the effect of modifications in each 
part of the system. 
The changes can be contemplated in Table 3, it includes items considering variations in 
the number of affiliates in the system, or changes in the mortality rates at retirement age, 
the probabilities of becoming disabled etc. which eventually lead us to the calculation of 
the needs for sponsor support, the buffer reserve or the necessity of triggering the 
automatic balance mechanism if it were implemented in the system.  
In effect, the income statement offers more detailed information regarding changes in the 
system and helps stakeholders and management to take informed decisions. In a private 
organisation, the financial health of the business is assessed through the income 
statement. The financial information can be prepared for reporting periods that are 
convenient for management and this allows them to compare and interpret the information 
with previous weekly or monthly reports, year to date or previous years comparative 
information. All changes can be interpreted and explained, which will help to foresee 
problem areas for the future, areas that need to be monitored more closely and to examine 
whether significant variances are once off or whether it is necessary to incorporate them 
into future budgets. 
Traditionally the public sector has relied on pure cash accounting. However, Public 
Pension systems prepared using the accruals accounting basis have the advantage of being 
                                                 
14 Our model is not a prospective one. For this approach we would have to work in a "budgetary" way, i.e. 
with explicit projections. Future research could deal with this issue. 
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able to see the complete picture by including the assets and liabilities of all components 
of the system at a particular moment in time improving decision making for the future.  
This could be beneficial for pension system affiliates in order to assess to what extent 
pension promises are reliable and to take decisions in the future when exercising their 
right to vote. However, by changing their voting options does not guarantee an 
improvement in the pension system given that a new political party may not fulfil its 
promises either. It does however give affiliates more information, which they can use as 
a tool to manifest their thoughts and priorities in relation to a change in the system. It also 
makes the system more transparent.  
Presently in Continental Europe, which uses a distribution method rather than a 
capitalisation method for pension systems gives an affiliate even less possibility to change 
the conditions than in the Swedish system. An increase in transparency, which could lead 
to a change in voting options, has less impact because it does not commit future 
governments to the interest of affiliates or even to a guarantee to contributions already 
accumulated by them in the system.  
It is a timely opportunity to consider the incorporation of financial pension reports 
prepared according to the accrual basis of accounting as we have public accounting 
standards that provide a solid base of guidance in relation to the objective of the 
information, the content of the reports and the application of valuation measurements. 
The accrual model allows for planification for the future and changes can be identified 
from comparative figures. The Swedish model takes into account the obligations of the 
system at a particular date and its corresponding future contributions at that point. 
In an article by de Haan et al. (2012) they consider that a model based on Projected 
Benefit Obligations (PBO) would be more fruitful than the accrual model. We totally 
agree that projected information is fruitful and necessary but principally for the 
management of the system and for taking internal decisions but the accrual method 
provides very clear information for the general needs of users taking into account the facts 
on the reporting date. 
The IPSAS 1 (IPSASB, 2017a) also includes budgeted and actual information as part of 
a complete set of financial information. PBO’s could therefore be included in future 
budgeting information. 
IPSAS 1 also takes into consideration the fundamental objective of the information being 
reported. It clearly states that financial statements shall present fairly the financial 
performance corresponding to the statements being reported. It explains that Fair 
presentation (FP) requires the faithful representation of the effects of transactions, other 
events, and conditions in accordance with the definitions and recognition criteria for 
assets, liabilities, revenue, and expenses set out in IPSASs (IPSASB, 2017b). The 
application of IPSASs (IPSASB, 2017b), with additional disclosures when necessary, is 
presumed to result in financial statements that achieve a fair presentation. This fair 
presentation is an alternative term, not always considered identical in the literature, used 
for the previously mentioned TFV. It is the incorporation of a term that requires these 
reports to show information that can be confided in. 
As previously mentioned, Boado-Penas et al. (2008) pointed out that the main aim of the 
ABS is to give a TFV of the pension system’s assets and liabilities at the beginning and 
end of the fiscal year. We add to this affirmation by indicating that an Income statement 
has as its main objective the provision of a TFV/FP of the changes in the net worth of the 
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pension system over a period of time classified into elements which are useful for 
information purposes. 
The incorporation of an Income Statement is another step in the improvement of Public 
Pension Reporting. We are presently at an early stage and future research will develop 
this information and make it more useful for stakeholders and especially policy makers 
as time moves on. A further step to increasing transparency and information needs could 
be done by complementing the Balance sheet and the Income Statement with a Cash Flow 
Statement as is done for Financial Reporting in the private sector. This will provide detail 
as to where the inflows and outflows of cash are occurring and also coincides with the 
objectives of IPSAS 1 on Presentation of Financial Statements (IPSASB, 2017a).  More 
specifically, IPSAS 1 specifies that accountability can be obtained by reporting on the 
source, allocation and uses of financial resources, by reporting on how activities were 
financed and how its cash requirements were met among other possibilities. 
Our model, which takes the Swedish model as a base is a step forward because it, also, 
incorporates the changes for disability pensions, the value of change in the discount rate 
and the explicit recognition of NCRs into the Income statement. 
In our opinion, improving the reporting mechanisms of pension reporting is essential 
without losing sight of the social objectives of the system. We believe there is moral duty 
to manage correctly pension contributions by affiliates and taxpayer contributions in 
order to obtain benefits for the population as a whole. 
We also believe that the main objective of the inclusion of an Income statement is to 
provide a TFV/FP of changes in the pension system over a period including them sub 
classified into more understandable and useful information than by just showing the 
difference in the net worth of the system from the balance sheet. 
4.-NUMERICAL ILUSTRATION. 
This section shows a numerical example representative of the model developed 
above. The numerical example is presented to make it easier for the reader to understand 
how the proposed model for financial reporting functions and what its main advantages 
and disadvantages are. To be more specific, the exercise, which should be viewed simply 
as an illustration, shows the annual changes in the system’s financial position via the 
income statement for a fictional already-functioning NDC pension system. The proposed 
scheme is not in operation in any country as yet. 
The starting point is the ABS of the scheme at the end of years 𝑡𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡𝑡 (Table 4). The 
system incorporates an MPB equivalent of 25% of the system's average wage (𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟25%) 
Changes in net worth are determined by comparing the system's assets and liabilities in 
these consecutive accounting periods. The table also shows the TD for the system, 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒕𝒕𝑺𝑺, 
and by contingency (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹;𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒕𝒕𝑻𝑻), the balance ratio, 𝑩𝑩𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕𝑺𝑺, (calculated without taking into 
account the part of the buffer fund corresponding to the sponsor’s support), the degree of 
funding, 𝑻𝑻𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕 , (the buffer fund divided by the pension liability of the system) and the 
liability structure ratio, 𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝒕𝒕 , (the ratio between the liabilities to contributors and total 
liabilities). 
At the end of year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 the system’s financial position is sound, since the balance ratio 
is greater than one (1.014), i.e. the accumulated surplus is positive. In general terms it can 
be said that this particular system is reasonably solvent, and that therefore at the date of 
the report the participants (contributors and pensioners) should have a realistic 
expectation of receiving the benefits that have been accrued, without the system’s sponsor 
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(the state) having to make any extraordinary contributions (except for future NCRs). Such 
a statement is made on the assumption that the system's rules and the economic and 
demographic conditions prevailing at the time of the valuation remain constant.  
As can be seen in Table 4, the degree of funding for this system is clearly positive 
(16.11%), mainly due to sponsor support and because the approach adopted to back up 
the increase in liabilities due to the introduction of a MPB is the buffer fund method. 
Therefore, the higher the level of the NCRs, the higher the degree of funding. 
Table 4: The ABS of a 𝑵𝑵𝑻𝑻𝑵𝑵𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅
𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐% scheme at the end of years t-1 and t with changes 
in net worth (monetary units) 
Items/year 𝒕𝒕 − 𝟏𝟏 𝒕𝒕 Variation 
Assets 
BF 11.500 11.730 0.230 
BF_(R+D)_NCR  5.500 5.588 0.088 
CA_(R) 80.120 81.963 1.843 
CA_(D) 19.880 20.079 0.199 
Ad_(R+D) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
L_(R+D) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total 117.000 119.360 2.360 
Liabilities and sponsor support (capital) 
Ss_(R+D) 10.000 10.000 0.000 
Con_(R) 55.510 56.620 1.110 
Con_(D) 12.260 12.505 0.245 
Pen_(R) 24.610 24.856 0.246 
Pen_(D) 7.620 7.772 0.152 
Pen_(R)_NCR 2.200 2.222 0.022 
Pen_(D)_NCR 3.300 3.366 0.066 
As_(R+D) 1.500 1.500 0.000 
P_(R+D) 0.000 0.518 0.518 
Total  117.000 119.360 2.360 
Solvency, funding and liability structure indicators 
𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒕𝒕
𝑺𝑺  (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹;𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒕𝒕𝑻𝑻) 31.92 (34.03; 25.55) 31.60 (34.37; 23.78) -0.3192 
𝑩𝑩𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕
𝑺𝑺 1.014 1.019 0.0046 
𝑻𝑻𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕 % 16.11 16.13 0.0002 
𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺𝒕𝒕 % 64.24 64.40 0.0016 
Source: Own.   
NB: The totals will not necessarily equal the sums of the rounded components. 
At the end of year t the system’s ABS reports a better financial position (1.019) than in 
the previous accounting period, given that for this period the system registers actuarial 
profits (0.519). In this situation, the accumulated surplus becomes larger, i.e. the change 
in net worth is positive. As anyone can see, in this accounting period the system has 
recorded profits because the difference between the variation in assets (2.360) and 
liabilities (1.842) is positive (0.518). The detailed changes in the system’s financial 
position by contingencies are shown on the income statement (Table 5). The study of this 
statement is the real novelty of this paper and enables us to deepen the analysis into the 
reasons behind the changes in the system’s solvency by type of benefit.  
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What first draws our attention in this income statement is that for this period the disability 
contingency registers losses (0.125) whereas the retirement contingency records profits 
(0.643). Expenditure on disability pensions is at around 26.15% of pension disbursement. 
As already stated, we do not reclassify pensions once they are in payment as this would 
prevent them from correctly determining the actuarial result by contingency. This makes 
sense from an actuarial point of view and enhances transparency. 
The system has a cash flow surplus because income from contributions plus sponsor 
contributions for NCRs is in excess of pension outlays. This excess is accumulated in the 
buffer fund, and the positive return on funded capital increases the fund asset at the end 
of the accounting period. This is also true if we examine the change in fund assets by 
contingency. 
Table 5: The income statement for the period t-1, t (monetary units) 
ITEMS System R D 
FUND ASSET (Changes) 0.318 0.197 0.121 
Pension contributions 3.229 2.385 0.844 
Sponsor contributions for NCRs 0.088 0.022 0.066 
Pension disbursements: -3.164 -2.337 -0.827 
Net return on funded capital 0.165 0.127 0.038 
CONTRIBUTION ASSET (Changes) 2.042 1.843 0.199 
Value of change in contribution revenue 3.057 1.036 2.021 
Value of change in turnover duration -1.015 0.806 -1.822 
Total LEFT SIDE 2.360 2.040 0.320 
LIABILITIES (Changes) 1.842 1.397 0.445 
New pension credit 3.229 2.385 0.844 
Recognition of NCRs 0.088 0.022 0.066 
Pension disbursements -3.164 -2.337 -0.827 
Indexation 0.900 0.720 0.180 
Value of change in life expectancy 0.030 0.010 0.020 
Value of change in discount rate 0.759 0,597 0,162 
NET WORTH (change) 0.518 0.643 -0.125 
Total RIGHT SIDE 2.360 2.040 0.320 
Source: Own.  
NB: The totals will not necessarily equal the sums of the rounded components. 
The ratio between (total) pension contributions and (total) pension disbursements is 
approximately 104.82%, so the system has a treasury surplus that amounts to 4.82% of 
the aggregate income from contributions. 
Changes in the contribution asset add net worth to the system (2.042), but the value of the 
change in the system’s turnover duration decreases the asset by the amount shown (-
1.015). Nevertheless, the value for the retirement contingency is positive, given that its 
associated TD is slightly higher in 𝑡𝑡 (34.37) than in 𝑡𝑡 − 1 (34.03).   
The analysis of changes in liabilities shows that the pension liability increases mainly 
with the annual indexation of pensions in payment and pension account balances (0.90), 
and the value of change in the discount rate (0.759). The annual changes of both items 
are determined by the change in the growth of the notional rate “G”. However, the effect 
on the pension liability works in the opposite direction. 
The higher the growth of the annual notional rate, the higher the pension liability due to 
the indexation mechanism. Obviously, for the item “value of change in discount rate” the 
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higher the growth of the annual notional rate used for valuing pensions in payment, the 
lower the pension liability. In this numerical example, this item increases the pension 
liability because the discount factor used is slightly lower than in the previous accounting 
period. In practice, to achieve a more accurate fair presentation in this income statement, 
the most suitable option for an already-functioning NDC scheme would be to use an 
estimated value of G based on the most recently observed data (the previous 3 or 5 years). 
This is in keeping with the principle that assets and liabilities are valued mainly on the 
basis of events and transactions that are verifiable at the time of valuation. 
In the Swedish System, for calculating the liability to pensioners, the initial pension of 
each cohort is multiplied by the economic annuity divisor (ED), which corresponds to an 
actuarial discount factor weighted by the number of pensioners with their respective 
pensions and with a technical interest rate of 1.6 percent, i.e., the assumed annual real 
growth rate for the income index (Vidal-Meliá et al., 2010; TSPS, 2018). This discount 
rate has remained unchanged since the inception of the system. Here a clear policy 
implication emerges, (Settergren, 2013) given that the procedure of fixing the discount 
rate over time seeks to maximize the stability of the solvency ratio. In practice, the 
introduction of a change in this item would increase the volatility of the system’s results 
and could trigger the ABM with more frequency.  
On the other hand, ignoring a change in this item by the Swedish authorities cannot be 
considered as appropriate from a fair presentation of the financial statements point of 
view. According to Palmer and Könberg (2019), during 2002–2017 real income growth 
per capita grew at an average rate of 2.1 percent, i.e., 0.5 percent per year above the 1.6 
percent applied in the actuarial factor used for computing the liability to pensioners. If 
the annual real income growth rate had to be used to calculate liabilities to pensioners, 
the net worth changes originally estimated would have been (very) different from those 
reported by the Swedish authorities; and what is more important, the ABM would not 
necessarily have been activated and/or the timing of triggering would have been different.    
We should bear in mind that a retrospective accounting exercise would be needed to 
respond properly to the above suggested issues about the Swedish NDC pension scheme. 
To conclude with the brief analysis of this illustrative exercise, it can be seen that the 
value of the change in life expectancy also increases the pension liabilities for retirees. 
The pension liability for active workers is unaffected by changes in mortality. This 
accounting model demands periodic updates of the life expectancy data for both 
collectives, i.e., periodic (static) mortality tables need to be frequently released. The use 
of mortality generational tables may introduce more instability in a pension institution’s 
accounts than periodic tables15. For the disability contingency, the value of the change in 
life expectancy assumptions shows a positive amount of 0.02 monetary units, which leads 
to an increase in disability pension liabilities.  
Finally, as in any double-entry accounting system, the net income or loss (change in net 
worth, 0.518 units in this example) equals the difference between the change in assets and 
the change in liabilities. 
  
                                                 
15 It has been demonstrated, Arnold- Gaille et al. (2019), that institutions that use mortality tables including 
future mortality evolution will most likely need to make more important adjustments (positive or negative) 
to their liabilities than institutions using periodic (static) tables whenever a new table is released. 
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5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper is in line with the ongoing debate on how to recognize and measure 
assets and liabilities of SSSs. This paper looks into the methodology labelled as 
“Swedish” open group developed for measuring liabilities and assets in contributory 
SSSs; the most relevant features are identified and compared to the traditional approaches 
and a literature review is also provided. In the literature, little attention has been paid to 
the SOG approach, so, the first contribution of this paper is to fill this gap. It is at least 
surprising that in a recent special issue of an international journal which addressed the 
topic of the actuarial and financial reporting of SS obligations, none of the published 
papers referred to this approach.  
The SOG approach has two relevant positive features. On the one hand, the way of 
measuring the system’s assets and liabilities has a high degree of transparency and needs 
no complicated projections of economic, financial or demographic variables, which could 
easily have a biased effect on the sustainability and solvency indicators. On the other 
hand, this approach is suitable to introduce automatic balance mechanisms (ABMs,) 
given that the possibly endless debates as to the accuracy of long term projections are 
avoided.  
The paper has developed a full accounting model for monitoring the solvency of a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) pension scheme with disability and minimum 
pension benefits; this is considered to be the second contribution. In line with the principle 
of separating the distributional aspects of social policy from the contributory aspect of 
the NDC scheme, the proposed model splits the system into two parts: the pure NDC part 
and the redistributive part, which includes the assets and liabilities originating from 
NCRs. 
To be more specific, using the annual report of the Swedish pension system as a 
benchmark (TSPS, 2018), we have extended the “Swedish” actuarial balance sheet 
developed by Pérez-Salamero et al. (2017) by adding an income statement which fully 
explains the reasons behind the changes in the system’s solvency by type of benefit. This 
paper has developed the most realistic case for an already-functioning NDC scheme and 
presented the technical details of the model, which makes it possible to integrate disability 
and minimum pension benefits within the NDC framework. 
Another valuable contribution is that the paper has highlighted the importance of 
disability within the contributory SSSs and the fact that disability costs need to be closely 
monitored; our paper covers this existing gap in the NDCs literature. The link between 
disability and NDC schemes is not a minor issue. The paper analyses how disability 
benefits are treated within the NDC framework and its relation with minimum pension 
benefits. It has been detected that there are several issues to be improved: discontinuities 
in benefit levels which occurred when disability benefits are converted into retirement 
benefits at the ordinary retirement age, the “system” gives incentives to become disabled 
before obtaining the retirement pension, the formula used to calculate the disability 
pension does not provide a clear link between benefits and contributions, a lack of 
transparency can be observed in the redistribution embedded in the defined benefit 
formula used to calculate disability benefits, and the specific life expectancy of the 
disabled people by age is not used to compute the disability benefit, which is surprising 
from an actuarial point of view. 
The example we develop adds value to the paper because it sheds light on the main 
differences between our proposal and the benchmark model which only includes the 
retirement contingency and doesn’t account for the NCRs. Furthermore, the example 
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clearly shows that this accounting framework integrates both contributory and social 
aspects of public pensions and discloses the real cost of the disability contingency and the 
redistribution through minimum pensions.  
With regard to the question asked in the title of this text, solid reasons have been given 
which highlight the importance of the pension system’s income statement and stress the 
need for presenting it annually for PAYG pension systems (in general) and for NDCs 
schemes in particular. The income statement offers more detailed information regarding 
changes in the system and helps stakeholders and management to take informed 
decisions, it is useful in evaluating the entity’s performance in terms of service costs, 
efficiency and accomplishments. The income statement can also be useful in predicting 
the level of resources required for continued operations, the resources that may be 
generated by continued operations and the associated risks and uncertainties. 
Last, but not least, our proposed income statement could serve as a guidance to improve 
the true and fair view of the Swedish actuarial balance sheet through a better 
determination of the changes in the system's net worth. 
To conclude, on the basis of the model presented in this paper and its associated numerical 
example; at least three important directions for future research can be identified. 
First, on the theoretical side, the use of the income statement in other models and a further 
step to increasing transparency and information needs could be achieved by 
complementing the Balance sheet and the Income Statement with a Cash Flow Statement 
as is done for Financial Reporting in the private sector. The preparation of what is 
considered to be a full set of financial statements by the IPSASs has to be the objective 
of all accruals based systems in the short term. 
The second direction would be on the applied side. In the Swedish System, for calculating 
the liability to pensioners, the initial pension of each cohort is multiplied by the economic 
annuity divisor (ED), which corresponds to an actuarial discount factor weighted by the 
number of pensioners with their respective pensions and with a fixed technical interest 
rate. This discount rate has remained unchanged since the inception of the system. In our 
opinion this practice cannot be considered as the most appropriate from a fair presentation 
point of view when more accurate information is available. It would be interesting to 
perform a retrospective accounting exercise using the annual real income growth rate to 
calculate liabilities to pensioners. The main aim of the proposed exercise would be to 
compute if the net worth changes estimated by the Swedish authorities would have been 
different from those originally reported using an updated discount rate; and what is more 
important, if the ABM would have been activated in the same years. 
Finally, a third direction would consist of designing a different ABM in coherence with 
the introduction of the item “Value of change in the discount rate” into the income 
statement.  Given that its introduction would increase the volatility of the system’s results 
and could trigger the automatic balance mechanism more frequently; which would also 
cause greater instability in pensioner’s benefits. The new ABM would be in the line of 
setting a no-action range for the balance ratio in order to avoid an excessive number of 
triggers. If the solvency indicator fell outside this range, the ABM could restore itself to 
within the no-action range. 
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APPENDIX 1.- GLOSSARY  
Accrual (or comprehensive) accounting principle: This principle recognizes 
transactions or events when they occur, irrespective of when the cash is paid or received. 
It seeks to match the costs incurred during a particular accounting period with the benefits 
earned, and the revenues with the goods or services provided. 
Accrued-to-date pension liability (ADL): In conceptual terms, this is similar to a 
termination reserve in a private sector or occupational pension plan. The level of the 
termination reserve can be regarded as the full funding level of the scheme. This amount 
thus also equals the resources that would be required to shut down a SSS while honouring 
all past commitments (Holzmann et al., 2001; Kaier and Müller, 2015; Drouin et al., 
2018). 
Advance funding financing method: Fully funded schemes use the full advance funding 
method, in which contributions are established to match the full cost of future benefits as 
these costs are incurred through current service. Such financing methods also provide for 
amortization over a fixed period for any financial obligation that is incurred at the 
beginning of the program (or subsequent modification) as a result of granting credit for 
past service (BOT, 2018). 
Asset test: A form of means test in which a person receives the supplementary benefit 
only if his/her assets are below a legislated threshold (Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2016).  
Automatic balance mechanism (ABM): An ABM is a set of predetermined measures 
established by law to be applied immediately as required according to an indicator that 
reflects the system’s financial health. Its purpose, through successive application, is to 
provide what could be called automatic financial stability, which can be defined as the 
capacity of a pension system to adapt to financial turbulence without legislative 
intervention. Turbulence can be caused by economic or demographic shocks that have an 
effect on the system’s solvency or financial equilibrium (Vidal-Meliá et al., 2008).   
Balance ratio: The contribution asset and the buffer fund, divided by the pension liability 
of the system. 
Balance sheet:  A statement, drawn up on a particular date, in relation to a specific entity 
of the values of assets owned and controlled and of the liabilities owed by an institutional 
unit or group of units (Eurostat, 2010). 
Canadian actuarial valuation report (CAVR): In Canada, similar methodology to that 
applied in the US has been used to draw up an AVR on the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) 
every three years since 1966. This involves projecting revenue and expenditure over a 
period of 75 years with the aim of accurately assessing the future effects of historical and 
projected trends in demography and economic factors. The CPP is considered 
unsustainable if the projected steady-state contribution rate (SSCR) for the next 75 years 
needs to be greater than that established by law (currently 9.9 percent) OSFIC (2018). 
The SSCR is the key financial measure for evaluating the CPP, specifically in relation to 
its adequacy and stability over time. It is defined as the lowest rate sufficient to ensure 
both the stabilization of the ratio of assets to the following year’s expenditures over time 
and the long-term financial sustainability of the Plan without recourse to further rate 
increases. Specifically, CPP regulations require the steady-state contribution rate be the 
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lowest rate such that the ratios of assets to the following year’s expenditures (A/E ratios) 
in the 10th and 60th year following the third year of the most recent review period are the 
same (Billig and Menard, 2018; Billig et al., 2018). The most recent report corresponds 
to the 2016-2090 period. 
Cash accounting principle: This principle recognizes transactions when cash is paid or 
received, but doesn’t necessarily coincide with the timing of the services provided or 
benefits received. 
Contingent asset: A possible asset that arises from past events, and whose existence will 
be confirmed only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain future 
events not wholly within the control of the entity (IAS 37 — Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets). 
Contingent liability: A possible obligation depending on whether some uncertain future 
events occur, or a present obligation but payment is not probable or the amount cannot 
be measured reliably (IAS 37 — Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets). 
Defined benefit scheme/formula (DB): In a DB pension scheme the level of pension 
benefits promised to contributors is determined by a formula agreed in advance, either 
alone or in combination with a guaranteed minimum amount payable. The risk of a DB 
scheme to provide an adequate income in retirement or when the affiliate becomes 
disabled is borne by the sponsor. 
Disabled: There are many definitions. It depends on the country. A person is considered 
disabled if he or she is determined to be suffering from a severe and prolonged mental or 
physical disability. A disability is considered severe if by reason of it the person is 
regularly incapable of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation; a disability is 
considered prolonged if it is likely to be long-term and of indefinite duration or is likely 
to result in death. (OSFIC, 2015). 
Funded defined contribution (FDC) schemes: These schemes used to be termed as 
“money purchase pension schemes” Under these schemes each individual receives a 
retirement benefit that comes entirely from the capital accumulated in her/his individual 
account. The amount of the pension depends, essentially, on the following factors: The 
wage profile across the working life cycle of the individual, the rate of contribution, as 
percent of wages, to the individual accounts, the real and forecasted mortality rates at the 
retirement age, and the rate of interest (market return), both during the working life of the 
individual and at the moment of retirement (assuming that pensioners receive a fixed 
annuity computed at retirement). (Eurostat, 2010). 
Income statement: It is also called a profit and loss statement, or a "P&L”. An income 
statement presents the results of a company's operations for a given period (In our context 
the pension scheme). The income statement presents a summary of the revenues, gains, 
expenses, losses, and net income or net loss of an entity for the period. Along with the 
balance sheet and the statement of cash flows, the income statement is one of the primary 
sources of financial information. 
Japanese actuarial method (JAM): It is based on OG methodology and uses a 95-year 
valuation period. Given that financial resources available for funding benefits are fixed 
(contribution levels and national subsidies), the method predicts, for several scenarios, 
the adjusted benefit levels in order to keep pension finances in equilibrium. Under the 
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current actuarial method, the period of financial equilibrium is finite, whereas the former 
method, applied until 1999, considered a perpetual time horizon. The latter time horizon 
was ruled out mainly because if the share of elderly population became very high, as was 
the case in Japan, the public pension system would have to manage enormous financial 
assets to be able to make use of the investment profit in the future.  JAM must be carried 
out at least every five years. The most recent report corresponds to 2014-2110 period 
(AAD, 2017).  
Mandatory spending: The defining characteristics of mandatory spending are that 
existing legislation has provided authority to obligate funds without future legislative 
action, and that beneficiaries have a political claim to “earned” benefits, even though they 
do not have a legally enforceable claim, if the authorizing law is changed (Phaup, 2019). 
Multiple overlapping generations model (MOLG): In our context, this model can be 
defined as a multi-state non-homogeneous Markov process in which inhomogeneity is 
already given because we work with participants of different ages in the context of 
overlapping generations and also with different patterns of transitions between states for 
a given range of ages. The model brings an actuarial approach to the accounting 
framework for organizing, summarizing and interpreting data on transfer systems and the 
life cycle developed in Lee (1994), Willis (1988) and Arthur & McNicoll (1978). 
Notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme: A PAYG pension plan that mimics a 
funded defined contribution plan. In this scheme, contributions (both from employee and 
from employer) are credited to, and accumulated on, individual accounts. Those 
individual accounts are notional, in the sense that the contributions to the schemes are 
used to pay pension benefits to current pensioners. At retirement, the accumulated balance 
is converted into an annuity through a formula, based, among other factors, on a measure 
of life expectancy, and is revised annually to catch up with a measure of the standard of 
living (Eurostat, 2010). Another relevant feature is that this scheme, if well designed, is 
fair in a sense that two individuals from the same birth cohort who make the same 
contributions into the scheme in the same period can expect to receive the same pension. 
These schemes are designed to balance liabilities and assets thus providing stability, and 
provides account information to participants as well as a system-wide financial statement; 
and changes the rhetoric of pension systems; it makes people think in terms of accounts 
(savings) rather than entitlements. 
Pay-as-you-go method: A financing method in which contributions are established to 
produce just as much income as required to pay current benefits; i.e., current contributors 
allow the use of their contributions or taxes to pay current pensioners’ benefits (previous 
contributing generations) (BOT, 2018). 
Pension reclassification: When a disabled pensioner reaches statutory retirement age, 
his or her disability benefits are (re)classified as retirement benefits. This is a widespread 
practice that masks the system's real status unless further pension information becomes 
available (Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá, 2014). 
Populism in pensions: The use of the public system as an electoral weapon by politicians, 
higher spending in the pension system is generated by unjustified increases in minimum 
pensions, the increase or extension of payments without the contributions to cover them, 
the awarding of disability pensions without rigour and contribution subsidies. Once the 
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elections are over, the populist politician presumably obtains his more or less ephemeral 
reward, but the cost to the pension system becomes structural. 
Social security pension schemes (SSSs): Contractual insurance plans where the affiliates 
as participants are obliged by general government to insure against old age and other risks 
such as disability, health etc. (Eurostat, 2010). 
Supplementary table (Table 29): The aim of the supplementary table is to give an 
overview of pension obligations (of general government but also of other institutional 
sectors) vis-à-vis households covering all pension schemes in social insurance. The 
figures in Table 29 present the perspective of the debtor (the pension scheme) indicating 
pension obligations (either liabilities or contingent liabilities) as well as that of the 
creditor (households) showing pension entitlements (either assets or contingent assets) 
(Eurostat, 2011). 
Sustainability: This term has to be understood as the system’s ability to fulfil current 
promises to pay benefits to beneficiaries in the long term without recurring to further 
increases in contribution rates, and/or that the sponsor will be forced to allocate 
extraordinary funds to cover the financing gap. 
The Ageing Working Group (AWG) pension reporting: The AWG is a well-
established EU framework, which has been in force since 2001. The most updated AWG 
pension exercise covers the period 2016–2070 (EC, 2018). The long-term projections 
show where (in which countries), when, and to what extent ageing pressures will 
accelerate as the baby-boom generation retires and as the people in the EU are expected 
to live longer in the future. Hence, the projections are helpful in highlighting the 
immediate and future policy challenges for governments posed by projected demographic 
trends. 
True and fair view (TFV): TFV ensures that financial statements reflect the economic 
realities of a business and its financial transactions. It is the comer stone in financial 
reporting. Auditors include an opinion in the audit report as to whether the financial 
statements of the audited company show a TFV. This opinion is important to users when 
taking decisions about the company because it is the opinion of someone independent of 
the company who has analyzed the company’s financial statements. If the opinion is that, 
the information shows a TFV, then users know that the company has complied with the 
applicable accounting standards or in the case where an accounting standard was not 
adequate, then additional information was included or that the standard in question was 
overridden in order to show a TFV.  
US actuarial balance (US AB): The US AB is a measure of the programme’s financial 
status for its 75-year valuation period as a whole. It is calculated for a traditional scenario-
based model and also using a stochastic model. It includes the trust fund asset reserves at 
the beginning of the period, all costs and income during the valuation period, and the cost 
of reaching a target trust fund reserve of one year’s cost by the end of the period. AB is 
expressed as a percentage of the taxable payroll for the 75-year valuation period. This 
single number summarizes the adequacy of programme financing for the period. The US 
AB is also calculated over the infinite horizon, but results are subject to much greater 
uncertainty (BOT, 2018). The US AB is compiled yearly since 1941. 
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APPENDIX 2.-DISABILITY, MINIMUM (GUARANTEED) PENSION 
BENEFITS AND NDCS IN PRACTICE. 
This appendix gives a brief picture on how disability benefits are treated within the NDC 
framework and its relation with minimum pension benefits. NDC plans are generally 
incorporated as one of the pillars in multi-pillar schemes that also include pillars based 
on other models, such as a mandatory funded DC and/or a social pension pillar. Latvia 
was the first country to fully implement a NDC scheme whereas such schemes were 
implemented gradually in Italy, Sweden and Poland in the 1990s and in Norway in 2011. 
Although a NDC scheme provides benefit for everyone who works and contributes to it, 
it will not necessarily provide everyone with a benefit that gives sufficient income for 
them to live on. It has long been recognized that NDC schemes should be supplemented 
with a minimum pension benefit (MPB). The introduction of a MPB is a way of 
preserving the social sustainability of the scheme as well as the adequacy of the pension.  
In the NDC schemes currently in place, retirement and permanent disability are not well 
integrated; many inconsistencies can be observed. Italy is the unique country in which the 
rate of contribution is not separated into contingencies, and the formula for calculating 
the disability benefits is embedded into the general formula for determining the retirement 
benefits. Also, the survivor benefits are included in the same formula.   
In Sweden, the current regulations on disability pensions are linked to the retirement 
pension system but not integrated into it. Individuals with disability benefits continue to 
accumulate pension entitlements in the public pension system. The pension contributions 
are paid from the central government’s budget. These payments, which are made annually 
from general tax revenues, are entered in the country’s accounts as a cost for the disability 
system and are part of the transfer from state revenues to the NDC pension fund. The 
formula for calculating benefits remains DB. Benefits are calculated as 64 percent of the 
assumed income; that is, the highest income from three of the last five-to-eight years, 
depending on age, up to a social security ceiling (Jönsson et al, 2012). 
Permanent disability benefits are converted into retirement benefits at the age of 65 (66 
in 2023). Because disability benefits are determined by a defined benefit formula, while 
old age benefits are determined by individual accounts, discontinuities in benefit levels 
are likely to occur when an individual switches from disability benefits to old age benefits 
(Wiese, 2006).  
The profound changes introduced to the public old-age pension system in Poland in 1999, 
2011, 2012 and 2014 left the disability benefit scheme unchanged16 (Chłoń-Domińczak 
and Strzelecki, 2013; AWG, 2018a; Buchholtz et al., 2019).  
                                                 
16 It is not easy to give a brief description of the Polish Pension system regarding the retirement contingency. 
Currently, under the general pension system there are several groups of insured individuals classified 
according to different sections of the system: 
a) People born before 1949 remained in the old DB system. 
b) People born 1949-1968 had a right to choose if they wanted to join a funded pillar or stay in a one 
pillar NDC. Their pension rights were recalculated into the new system as initial capital. If they 
chose a one pillar system they have a one NDC account (They “earn” interest on accumulated 
contributions equal to the change in the overall contribution revenue, which represents the changes 
in the covered wage bill growth.) 
c) People born 1949-1968 who didn’t choose the one pillar system and who joined the funded tier 
and people born after 1968 who were obliged to join the funded pillar have the following situation: 
Their pension rights were recalculated into the new system as initial capital. They have two NDC 
accounts (account and subaccount). 
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In 2010 it was proposed by the government to replace the old formula for calculating 
disability benefits which was based on the length of the contributory and non-contributory 
periods, with a new one linking disability pensions to the amount of the old-age NDC 
pension entitlements. The reform had the objective of providing a consistent calculation 
of disability and retirement pensions. To avoid the situation of when young affiliates who 
become disabled and have an insufficient contributory record (less than 30 years) 
resulting in a low value in the NDC account were exposed to poverty, it was planned to 
add a “contributory bonus”. To calculate the disability benefit, the accumulated notional 
capital was going to be increased by the average monthly contribution for each month 
that was missing to fulfil the 30 years from the year of application for disability benefit 
and the year of the persons 60th birthday. The monthly disability benefit would be equal 
to the ratio of the pension balance (estimated notional capital) and the expected unisex 
life expectancy at 60 years old. Due to presumed negative effects on replacement rates, 
the reform was rejected.  
The disability pensions of persons who have reached the statutory retirement age17 is 
replaced with old-age pensions. The rules of the system currently in operation make it 
possible that most disability beneficiaries who reach the statutory retirement age may 
expect higher retirement benefits than individuals retiring under the NDC/FDC system in 
force. The disability benefit formula in place is quite a complex procedure, based on the 
length of the contributory and non-contributory periods, the general base amount (BA), a 
common amount used countrywide for all types of social benefits, the hypothetical carrier 
path and the degree of disability (person completely unable to work or partly unable to 
work). (Jabłonowski and Freudenberg, 2014; ZUS, 2017; AWG, 2018a). 
In Italy, the formula used to calculate the disability pension does not provide a clear link 
between benefits and contributions (AWG, 2018b). Under the NDC scheme, the 
retirement benefit is calculated as a product of two factors: the total lifelong contributions, 
capitalized with the nominal GDP growth rate (five-year geometric moving average) and 
the transformation coefficient, the calculation of which is mainly based on the 
probabilities of death, the probabilities of leaving a surviving spouse, and the average 
outliving period.  
The retirement benefit (adapted to the nomenclature used in our model) for an individual 
who retires at the ordinary retirement age (𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴 = 𝑟𝑟) at time 𝑡𝑡 after contributing for the 
maximum number of years (𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴), is computed as:  
𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 = 𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ ∑ 𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑠𝑠) ∙ ∏ �1 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�����ℎ�𝐴𝐴−1ℎ=𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴−1𝑠𝑠=0���������������������
accumulated notional capital
𝛿𝛿(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡�
annuity divisor
 
[7.] 
 
                                                 
FDC account active - if they decided to stay in a funded pillar after the 2013 reform and still pay 
contributions to this pillar. 
FDC account non-active - if they decided to pay all contributions to NDC accounts but part of the funds 
remained accumulated in the funded system. 
In the NDC subaccount the contributor earns an interest rate based on quarterly GDP growth, and similarly 
to the Swedish NDC account, the capital accumulated is inherited if the worker dies before reaching 
retirement age. 
d) People who entered the labour market after the 2013 reform and didn’t choose the funded pillar. 
They have two NDC accounts (account and subaccount). 
17 The statutory retirement age for men and women is being risen gradually, for women from 60 to 67 (from 
2013 until 2040) and for men from 65 to 67 (from 2013 until 2020). 
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Where, 𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 , is the accumulated notional capital for an individual who retires at the 
ordinary retirement age at time t after contributing for the maximum number of years;   𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 = 1𝛿𝛿(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡  is the conversion coefficient18; 
 𝛿𝛿(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡  is the annuity divisor to transform the accumulated entitlements (pension wealth, 
notional capital) into the annual pension benefit;  
𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 is the accredited contribution rate;  
𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎) is the contribution base for the contributor aged 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑠𝑠; 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺������ℎ is the geometric mean of the nominal GDP growth rate in the 5 years preceding the 
year in which the attained age of the contributor is 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑠𝑠. 
Unlike the Swedish model and the Polish NDC subaccount, the capital accumulated in 
the individual pension balance does not include inheritance gains; i.e., the account 
balances of affiliates who do not survive until retirement, are distributed as a survivor 
dividend to the accounts of the non-disabled active survivors on a birth cohort basis.  
Except for the issue of the survivor dividend, Formula (7) presents the typical structure 
of those used in NDC schemes, but in reality, it is very specific due to the fact that the 
annuity divisor includes the possibility of paying survivor benefits:  
𝛿𝛿(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡 =
∑
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎)���
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎)�
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞
𝑎𝑎=𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒 
2 − 𝐺𝐺 
[8.] 
 
𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎) = � 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎)𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤−𝑟𝑟−1
𝑘𝑘=0
 ∙ (1 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒)−𝑘𝑘 = � 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎)𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤−𝑟𝑟−1
𝑘𝑘=0
 ∙ �1 + 𝜆𝜆1 + 𝑟𝑟�𝑘𝑘  [9.] 
 
𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎) = 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎 ∙ � 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎)𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤−𝑟𝑟−1
𝑘𝑘=0
∙  𝑞𝑞(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘,𝑎𝑎) ∙ (1 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒)−𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝜗𝜗(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘,𝑎𝑎) ∙ 𝑎𝑎(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘+1,𝑔𝑔∗)𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤   [10.] 
 
𝑎𝑎(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘+1,𝑎𝑎∗)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘+1−𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎∗)𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤−𝑟𝑟−𝑘𝑘+𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔
𝐿𝐿=1
∙ 𝑞𝑞(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘+𝐿𝐿−𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎∗)𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∙ (1 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒)−𝐿𝐿 ∙  [11.] 
 
Where, 
𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎) is the present value at age r of 1 monetary unit of a lifetime pension payable in 
advance with a real technical interest rate equal to 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒; 
                                                 
18 Until the end of 2012, the transformation coefficients were foreseen only for the age bracket 57-65. For 
retirement ages below (i.e. disability pensions) or above the range, the lowest and the highest coefficients 
were respectively applied. As of 2013, the upper limit of the age range has been extended to 70 and then 
further, in line with the increase in the eligibility requirements brought about by changes in life expectancy 
(AWG, 2018b) 
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 𝐺𝐺 is an actuarial adjustment factor that considers the way in which pensions are provided 
(1 month in advance, 2 months in advance, 1 year in advance and so on) 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎)𝑘𝑘 , is the gender-𝑠𝑠-specific probability that a person aged 𝑟𝑟 years will reach age 𝑟𝑟 +
𝑘𝑘;  
𝑤𝑤 is the maximum life span; (1+𝑟𝑟)(1+𝜆𝜆) − 1 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒 is the long-run expected GDP real growth rate; 𝑟𝑟 is the internal rate of 
return in nominal terms; 𝜆𝜆 is the pension in payment indexation rate. 
𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎) is the present value at age r of survivor benefits linked to 1 unit of retirement 
benefits; 
𝑞𝑞(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘,𝑎𝑎)is the gender-𝑠𝑠-specific probability that a person aged 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑘𝑘 years will die within 
the year; 
𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎 is the fraction of the annuity paid to the widow(er) (𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎 = 0.6 ∙ 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎) , where 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 is a gender 
earning related reduction factor, set equal to (0.7) 0.9 if 𝑔𝑔 is (fe)male);  
𝜗𝜗(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘,𝑎𝑎) is the age-and-gender specific probability to be married; 
𝑎𝑎(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘+1,𝑎𝑎∗)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the present value of 1 monetary unit of a lifetime pension paid to the 
widow(er) at age 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑘𝑘 + 1;  
𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎 is the age difference between pensioner and his/her widow(er); 
𝑔𝑔 ∗ stands for the gender of the widow(er); 
𝑞𝑞(𝑟𝑟+𝑘𝑘+𝐿𝐿−𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎∗)𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  is the age and gender-specific probability for the widow(er) to remarry.   
The formula for calculating disability benefits (adapted to the nomenclature used in our 
model) is even more complex. For an individual who becomes disabled at age (𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 =
𝐺𝐺) at time 𝑡𝑡 after having contributed for the maximum possible number of years (𝑐𝑐 = 𝑘𝑘), 
is computed as:  
𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ ∑ 𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑠𝑠) ∙ ∏ �1 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�����ℎ�𝑘𝑘−1ℎ=𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘−1𝑠𝑠=0���������������������
𝐾𝐾(𝑑𝑑,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 =𝐴𝐴ccumulated entitlements
𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ ∑ 𝑦𝑦 ∗(𝐺𝐺−𝑠𝑠)5𝑠𝑠=1 5 ∙ (60 − 𝐺𝐺)�����������������
𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛
𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐺𝐺𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠  
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 (𝐹𝐹,57)𝑡𝑡  
 
[12.] 
 
Where, 𝑦𝑦 ∗(𝐹𝐹−𝑎𝑎), is the appropriately adjusted contribution base in the preceding 5 years 
before the disability occurs. 
As depicted in formula (12), disability pensions are based on the notional capital at the 
time of disability, and this is integrated taking into account the gap between the 
individual’s age when the pension is awarded and the reference age of 60. More 
specifically, the disability benefit is computed firstly by applying rules as established for 
the old-age/early retirement pension. To the benefit computed in this way, a “contributory 
bonus”, equal to the years of contributions from the age of claiming to the age of 60, is 
then added19. This bonus is calculated based on the wages in the preceding 5 years before 
the disability onset. If the claimant is younger than 57, the favourable conversion 
coefficient for retirement at age 57 is applied (Belloni and Maccheroni, 2013). 
In Latvia, as in Sweden, when claiming a disability pension, the social security budget 
pays old-age pension contributions to the NDC and FDC accounts, hence accruing old-
age pension entitlements. These contributions are based on half the average wage that is 
subject to social security contributions. In 2016 this amount was slightly lower than the 
                                                 
19 Up to a maximum of 40 years. 
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minimum wage. Therefore, the benefits provide limited work disincentives as the old-age 
pension entitlements increase faster when working even at minimum wage than when 
claiming disability pension. 
Disability benefits are determined by a defined benefit formula, the amount of the benefits 
depends on the degree of disability, the contribution base of the preceding 5 years before 
the disability occurs (the highest earnings for 3 years in the previous 5-year period) and 
the number of contributed years. 
Upon reaching the retirement age20, disability pensions are converted into old age 
pensions according to NDC rules, but the old-age pension cannot be lower than the 
granted disability benefit. The converted disability pensions might generate higher old 
age pensions for some individuals than those retiring at the official retirement age. These 
features might create some financial incentives to apply for disability pensions (OECD, 
2018) 
In Norway, the NDC scheme was implemented in 2011. As part of the pension reform in 
2011, the Government proposed a new disability scheme and a new model for calculating 
old-age pensions for individuals previously classified as disabled. The new disability 
scheme was introduced from 2015, and under current regulations, the disability benefit is 
calculated more as a short-term benefit with a replacement rate of 66 per cent and taxed 
as earnings (Fredriksen and Stølen, 2015). Permanent disability benefits are converted 
into retirement benefits at the age of 67. The government decided that the reduction in 
yearly benefits caused by growing life expectancy for a newly disabled at the age of 67 
should only be one half of the reduction implemented for former non-disabled retiring at 
this age. By introducing a weaker life expectancy adjustment for earlier disabled, the 
reform may strengthen the incentives to retire as a disability pensioner (Fredriksen et al., 
2019). 
As far as the provision of guaranteed pension benefits is concerned, there are big 
differences among the countries with NDC schemes in force.   
In Sweden, the guaranteed pension provides basic social security for individuals with 
little or no income. Residents in Sweden are eligible for a guaranteed pension beginning 
at age 65. This will be raised to 66. To receive a full guaranteed pension, an individual 
must have resided in Sweden for 40 years after the age of 25, however residence in 
another EU/EEA country can also be credited towards a guaranteed pension. The Swedish 
guarantee begins with a floor, above which it tapers off as it is means tested against the 
public NDC and FDC pensions (Palmer and Könberg, 2019). The guaranteed pension is 
financed by the tax revenue from the central-government budget and is therefore not 
included in the income statement and balance sheet of the pension system (TSPS, 2018). 
Guarantee disability benefit is granted to those who have had little or no income. The size 
of the benefit depends on age and how long the individual has lived in Sweden (Blomberg, 
2013). 
In Poland, there is a minimum pension guarantee (MPG) linked to the contributory 
system. If the retirement pension (a sum of NDC and FDC pension, see Appendix 1) is 
below the minimum level, the pension is topped-up by the MPG, which is financed by 
the state budget. The guarantee is subject to eligibility criteria, which are reaching the 
minimum retirement age and work experience of 20 years for women and 25 years for 
                                                 
20 The normal retirement age is 63 years and 3 months for both men and women in 2018 and it will reach 
65 in 2025. 
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men (this requirement for women will increase with a rise in the retirement age). The 
MPG is also in force for permanent disability benefits (ISSA, 2018),  
In Latvia, there are three sources of income to help older people meet a minimum standard 
of living: basic pension, minimum pension, and universal, age-independent guaranteed 
minimum income (GMI). The basic pension is a tax financed benefit for those who are 
over the retirement age and who fulfil the 5-year residency condition, but have less than 
15 years of contribution to earnings-related pensions. Before 2017, the age threshold for 
being entitled to the basic pension was the retirement age plus five years. 
Minimum pensions are granted to people who fulfil the 15-year contribution condition 
for regular pensions, but whose entitlements are lower than the minimum pension 
threshold. The minimum pension increases with the contribution period, from 15 years to 
a maximum of 41 years of contribution. The age-independent GMI benefit, which is 
provided by the municipalities, might complement the income of poor retirees. The GMI 
is paid to the households whose income per capita is below the established GMI threshold. 
This benefit covers the difference between income from other sources and the GMI 
threshold (OECD, 2018). 
In Italy, there is a safety net for the elderly on low income, regardless of contributions. 
The safety net consists of two kinds of social assistance benefits: the old age allowance 
and additionally the low-income pension supplement. Both are means-tested and subject 
to a minimum age requirement of 65 years and 7 months in 2016, increased by 1 year in 
2018, and linked to changes in life expectancy. The guaranteed minimum pension is paid 
to social insurance or mixed program pensioners with a monthly pension lower than the 
living minimum income. For the disability contingency, the amount depends on age and 
the annual income of the pensioner. For 2018, the minimum monthly disability pension 
is €507.42 for a pensioner aged 60 or older with personal income less than €13,192.92 
and household income less than €26,385.84. There is no minimum disability pension 
otherwise. There is no maximum disability pension. (ISSA, 2018).  
In Norway, strong elements of redistribution are maintained with the new NDC system. 
A guaranteed pension of 2 basic pension units (BPU) for singles and 1.85 BPU per person 
for couples secures a minimum level of benefits for pensioners with low labour incomes. 
BPU is a measurement unit in the National Insurance Scheme corresponding to about 1/6 
of the average annual wage level for a full-time employee. The guaranteed pension 
secures a comparatively high minimum benefit to individuals with low earnings-related 
entitlements – with a gross level for a single pensioner at about 36 percent of an average 
fulltime wage. The guaranteed pension is means-tested by 80 per cent against NDC-
pension rights, and even persons with small incomes will obtain a level of pension 
benefits somewhat higher than the minimum level (2 or 1.85 BPU depending on the civil 
status of the recipient) (Fredriksen and Stølen, 2015; Halvorsen and Pedersen, 2019). 
Table 6 summarizes the main features of the countries described above. 
  
46 
 
 
Table 6: Disability, minimum (guaranteed) pension benefits and NDCs in practice: Summary (part 1) 
Countries/concepts Disability formula Minimum Pension/Guarantee 
Disability Benefits (DB) 
in the retirement period 
Sweden 
Formula for calculating benefits remains defined 
benefit. Benefits are calculated as 64 percent of 
the assumed income. Individuals with disability 
benefits continue to accumulate pension 
entitlements in the public pension system. The 
pension contributions are paid from the central 
government budget. 
Guarantee disability and retirement 
benefits are granted to those who have had 
little or no income. 
Permanent DB are converted into 
retirement benefits at age 65. 
Discontinuities in benefit levels are 
likely to occur. 
Poland 
Defined Benefit formula for calculating 
benefits, based on the length of the contributory 
and non-contributory periods, the general base 
amount, the hypothetical carrier path and the 
degree of disability. 
If the retirement pension is below the 
minimum level, the pension is topped-up 
by the minimum pension guarantee 
(MPG), which is financed from the state 
budget. The MPG is also in force for 
permanent disability benefits. 
Replaced by retirement pensions for 
beneficiaries who have reached the 
statutory retirement age. In most 
cases, their (retirement) benefits are 
higher than those of individuals 
retiring under the new NDC/FDC 
system. 
Italy 
Defined contribution formula based on the 
notional capital accumulated at the time of 
disability plus a “contributory bonus” which 
depends on the disability claimant's age and the 
wages in the preceding five years before the 
disability onset. The formula includes the 
possibility of paying survivor benefits: 
Guaranteed minimum pension: Paid to 
social insurance or mixed program 
pensioners with a monthly pension lower 
than the minimum living income. 
There is no change. 
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Table 6: Disability, minimum (guaranteed) pension benefits and NDCs in practice: Summary (part 1) 
Countries/concepts Disability formula Minimum Pension/Guarantee 
Disability benefits (DB) 
in the retirement period 
Latvia 
Disability benefits are determined by a defined 
benefit formula, the amount of the benefits 
depends on the degree of disability, the 
contribution base for the preceding five years 
before the disability occurs (the highest earnings 
for three years in the previous 5 year period) and 
the number of contributed years. 
The minimum monthly old-age pension 
varies with the number of years 
contributed to the system. The higher the 
number of years insured the higher the 
guaranteed benefit.  
Disability pensions are converted into 
old age pensions according to NDC 
rules, but the old-age pension cannot 
be lower than the granted disability 
benefit. 
Norway 
The disability benefit is equivalent to 66 percent 
of the contribution base, based on the three 
highest years for the preceding five years before 
the affiliate becomes disabled. If a person has 
not lost their entire earnings capacity, the 
disability benefit is graded. 
If the individual has had low or no income, 
she/he is entitled to a basic benefit. A 
guaranteed pension of 2 basic pension 
units (BPU) for singles and 1.85 BPU per 
person for couples, secures a minimum 
level of benefits for pensioners with low 
labour incomes. BPU is a measurement 
unit in the National Insurance Scheme 
corresponding to about 1/6 of the average 
annual wage level for a full-time 
employee. 
After the age of 67, anyone receiving 
disability benefit will receive a 
retirement pension instead. Disability 
pensioners are partially exempted 
from life age adjustments, so the 
“system” gives incentives to become 
disabled before obtaining the 
retirement pension. 
Source: Own 
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APPENDIX 3.-TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
This technical appendix summarizes the basics of the theoretical model in the steady state 
and the main formulas used to build the actuarial balance.  
The multiple state model used as a basis, (𝒮𝒮,𝒯𝒯), is a non-homogeneous multi-state 
discrete time Markov process, {𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℤ+}, where 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) is the random variable that 
represents the process state at time 𝑡𝑡 with values in the finite state space, 𝒮𝒮 = {𝑎𝑎, 𝑟𝑟,𝐺𝐺, 𝑓𝑓}, 
a set of four possible random events that represent statuses of the PAYGO scheme 
members, with just one state at any time: contributors (active) (𝑎𝑎), retired (healthy) (𝑟𝑟), 
disabled (𝐺𝐺), and deceased (𝑓𝑓). The potential transitions between the states are described 
by a set of direct possible unidirectional ordered pairs 𝒯𝒯 ={(𝑎𝑎, 𝑟𝑟), (𝑎𝑎, 𝑓𝑓), (𝑎𝑎,𝐺𝐺), (𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓), (𝐺𝐺, 𝑓𝑓)}, whose associated transition probabilities depend 
only on the current state of the process (Ventura-Marco and Vidal-Meliá, 2014 and 2016). 
The above set up, combined with the standard double-entry bookkeeping method with 
mathematical demography, can be termed as a multiple overlapping generations model 
(MOLG).   
Number of contributors by age at time 𝒕𝒕: 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡) ∙𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, in which 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is 
the probability that an active person aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 years will reach age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 − 1  being 
active. This includes the decrements due to death and disability associated with each age 
(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒  + 𝑘𝑘 ∈ [𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 , 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴 − 1]) at time 𝑡𝑡, with no possibility of a return to active life being 
considered. It is a different matter when it comes to considering decrements involving the 
economically active population or new entries over time due to migratory movements. 
These are included in parameter 𝛾𝛾, which is an annual accumulative rate. 
Average wage (contribution base) at time 𝒕𝒕: 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,1) · (1 + 𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡−1, i.e. the 
contribution base (coinciding with earnings) grows at an annual rate of 𝑔𝑔 affecting all 
groups of contributors. A concave income profile typical of developed countries is 
assumed. The age-wage structure only undergoes proportional changes. The slope of the 
age-wage structure is constant. 
Number of disabled people:  
For each age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 ∈ [𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 1, 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴], the total number of disabled at time 𝑡𝑡 can be 
calculated by: 
𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹 = �𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘+𝑎𝑎) ∙𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘
𝑎𝑎=1
 [13.] 
where 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎−1,𝑡𝑡−1) ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎−1𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹  is the new disabled pensioners for age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑠𝑠  
in 𝑡𝑡, obtained as the product of active workers or contributors of age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑠𝑠 − 1 in 
previous time 𝑡𝑡 − 1 and the probability that an active person aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑠𝑠 − 1 will become 
disabled during the year. 𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  is the probability that a disabled person aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑠𝑠 
will survive until age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 being disabled. The structure of the survivor disabled will 
depend on the survival probabilities (𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ), which are different from those for the active 
population (𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) and incorporate all those who became disabled in successive earlier 
periods and have survived.  
From age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴 + 1 years onwards, no more new disabled people are taken into account 
because all the disabled in the system are considered by definition to be survivor disabled, 
and so for age interval [𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴 + 1,𝑤𝑤 − 1], i.e. 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,𝑤𝑤 − 1 −  (𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴)}, we 
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get: 
𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹 = 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘)𝐹𝐹 ∙𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ��𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘+𝑎𝑎−𝐴𝐴) ∙𝐴𝐴−𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎=1
� ∙𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  [14.] 
There are 𝑘𝑘∈ {1, 2,…,𝐴𝐴} different contribution pathways that will determine 𝑘𝑘 
different pensions, as contributors might be working for 1 year, 2 years…, 𝑘𝑘 years. For 
𝑐𝑐 = 𝑘𝑘, these pensions would be for people with a full contribution history, i.e. those 
who enter the labour market at the earliest age (𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒) and exit aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 − 1 for 
disability 
𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) = �𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘
𝑒𝑒=1
 [15.] 
and 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴 years for retirement, 
𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡) = �𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝐴𝐴
𝑒𝑒=1
 [16.] 
Determining the Average Initial Pension in a Pure NDC Scheme: 
 Disability 
The pure NDC average pension for disabled individuals at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘, with 
𝑘𝑘∈ {1, 2,…,𝐴𝐴}, computed as a weighted pension of the 𝑘𝑘 different disability pensions 
once settled, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ {1, … ,𝑘𝑘}, is: 
𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒=1 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)  [17.] 
where 
𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇]  is the initial disability pension awarded using the NDC formula, 
𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] = �𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑒𝑒−1,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1)� ∙ (1 + 𝐺𝐺)𝛼𝛼?̈?𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺  [18.] 
with 𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑒𝑒−1,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒  as the cumulated notional capital (or pension balance) at time 𝑡𝑡 −1 for one individual aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 − 1 who has been contributing for the last 𝑐𝑐 − 1 years. 
It is obvious that 
𝐾𝐾�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = ∑ 𝐾𝐾(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑐𝑐−1,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒=1 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)  [19.] 
𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 is the credited contribution rate;  
?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘
𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼  is the annuity factor: 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇, i.e. the present value of a lifetime annuity for the 
disabled of 1 monetary unit per year payable in advance and growing at real rate 𝛼𝛼, valued 
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at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 years and with a technical interest rate equal to 𝐺𝐺,  the wage bill growth 
(The rate of return of the model in equilibrium).  
The system's income from contributions also grows (decreases) at rate 𝐺𝐺 = (1 + 𝑔𝑔)(1 +
γ ) − 1, where the contribution base grows at an annual rate of 𝑔𝑔 and the economically 
active population increases or decreases over time at an annual accumulative rate of 𝛾𝛾, 
affecting all groups of contributors equally. 
The total accumulated notional capital in year 𝑡𝑡 for the generation aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘, 
𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, … ,𝐴𝐴}, can be expressed as: 
𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = ∑ 𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒=1  
[20.] 
= 
�𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1) ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1)� ∙ (1 + 𝐺𝐺) ∙ �1 − 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 � = 
𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ ��𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘−1
𝑎𝑎=0
∙ � �𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+ℎ
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 �𝑘𝑘−1
ℎ=𝑎𝑎
�� 
where 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+ℎ
𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹  is the probability that an active person aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + ℎ will become disabled 
during the year.  
If we include contributions made in year 𝑡𝑡 for the generation aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 years and take 
into account formula [15.], we get 𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒[+] = 𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡). Hence 
with the total accumulated notional capital in year 𝑡𝑡 for the generation aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘, and 
with contributions for time 𝑡𝑡 being included at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴 − 1} 
for all contributors who reach that age, 
 Retirement 
The pure NDC average pension for retirement at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴, computed as a weighted 
pension of the 𝑘𝑘 different disability pensions once settled, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ {1, … ,𝐴𝐴}, is: 
𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒=1 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡) = 𝐾𝐾�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼  [21.] 
Where, 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁]  the initial retirement pension awarded using the NDC formula.  
?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴
𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼  is the annuity factor: 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁, i.e. the present value of a lifetime annuity for the 
retired of 1 monetary unit per year payable in advance and growing at real rate 𝛼𝛼, valued 
at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴 years and with a technical interest rate equal to 𝐺𝐺. 
𝐾𝐾�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒  is the total average accumulated notional capital or pension balance at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 +
𝐴𝐴: 
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𝐾𝐾�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ �∑ 𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡)𝐴𝐴−1𝑠𝑠=0 ∙ �∏ �𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺 �𝐴𝐴−1ℎ=𝑠𝑠 �����������������������������������
 𝐾𝐾(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐
𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)  
[22.] 
and 𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒  is the total accumulated notional capital at time t for all individual 
contributors who reach age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴, it can also be expressed as: 
𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 · �𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡−𝐴𝐴) · 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘+𝑡𝑡−𝐴𝐴)���������The average wage (contribution base) · (1 + 𝐺𝐺)𝐴𝐴−𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴−1
𝑘𝑘=0
 [23.] 
Determining the Average Initial Pension with a Minimum Pension Benefit  
 Disability 
The average pension for disabled individuals at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘, with 𝑘𝑘∈ {1, 2,…,𝐴𝐴}, 
computed as a weighted pension of the 𝑘𝑘 different disability pensions once settled, 
𝑐𝑐 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘𝑘}, is: 
𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒=1 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇  [24.] 
  
where 
𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] ,𝑃𝑃(Ω,𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁� is the amount of the effective initial pension income 
for disability paid at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 with 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1, … ,𝐴𝐴} and with 𝑐𝑐 ∈ {1, … ,𝑘𝑘} years of 
contributions recorded, with 𝑃𝑃(Ω,𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁 as the minimum (disability) pension and 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇]  the 
initial disability pension awarded using the NDC formula. 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇  is the average supplementary disability benefit for age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘, defined as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �𝑃𝑃(Ω,𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] , 0� ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒=1 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)  [25.] 
Under the assumption that all pensions are indexed at the same rate (𝛼𝛼), we can define 
the difference between the present value of the positive differences between the minimum 
pensions awarded and the account balances of participants available at the time of the 
disability (𝑡𝑡) for age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘 by 
𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼  [26.] 
 Retirement 
The average pension for individuals who retire at the ordinary retirement age, computed 
as a weighted pension of the 𝐴𝐴 different retirement pensions once settled, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ {1, … ,𝐴𝐴}, 
is: 
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𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒=1 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡) = 𝐾𝐾�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼 + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁  
 
[27.] 
 
  
where 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �𝑃𝑃(Ω,𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁 ,𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] � is the initial benefit awarded at retirement 
age, with  
𝑃𝑃(Ω,𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁: For simplicity, with the additional assumption that there is a common MPB for 
both contingencies. 
The average supplementary retirement benefit at time 𝑡𝑡 is defined as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 = ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �𝑃𝑃(Ω,𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] , 0� ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒=1 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼  [28.] 
with  
𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 =𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼  having the same meaning as 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇  but for the 
retirement contingency at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴. 
In short, the main way in which this differs from a pure NDC scheme (Ventura-Marco 
and Vidal-Meliá, 2016) is that, if the amount of the initial disability and retirement 
pensions is below a minimum value, the amount is supplemented up to the minimum 
benefit. The minimum pension guarantee requires that the government pay an amount 
equivalent to the difference between the accumulated notional pension account at time of 
retirement and the amount that would provide an annuity equivalent to the MPB. 
The liabilities side 
The actuarial accounting proposal splits the system into two parts: the actuarial part (pure 
NDC) and the redistributive part, which includes the assets and liabilities originating from 
non-contributory rights (NCRs).  
A) The actuarial part (NDC) 
Liability to current pensioners for retirement contingency 
For the retirement contingency, the NDC liability to pensioners is equal to: 
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃�(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] ∙ � 𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤−1−(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴)
𝑘𝑘=0  [29.] 
where 𝐵𝐵 = 1+𝛼𝛼
1+𝐺𝐺
 is an indexation factor which depends on 𝛼𝛼 and 𝐺𝐺. 
Liability to current pensioners for disability  
For disability contingency, the NDC liability to pensioners can be expressed as: 
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𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 = ���𝑃𝑃�(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡)𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘−𝑠𝑠 ∙𝑘𝑘−𝑠𝑠 𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘
𝑠𝑠=1 � ∙
𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1 ?̈?𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝛼𝛼  
[30.] 
+ 
� ��𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] ∙𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎=1
𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 ∙𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 � ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼
𝑤𝑤−(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴)
𝑘𝑘=1
 = 
�𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] ∙
𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹 ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼�������������������
𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 + � 𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] ∙𝑤𝑤−(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴)
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹 ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼
���������������������������
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹
 
where 
𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇]  is the average pension for disabled individuals at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘, for which disability 
occurred  𝑘𝑘 − 𝑠𝑠 periods before, that is: 
𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] = ∑ 𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) ∙𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎=1 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹  [31.] 
Likewise, it can be defined 𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] . 
Liability to current contributors for retirement  
The NDC liability to contributors for retirement is equal to: 
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 =  �𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒(𝑁𝑁)𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1  
[32.] 
 = 
𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ ���𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘−1
𝑎𝑎=0
𝐴𝐴−1
𝑘𝑘=0
∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) ∙ � �𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐺𝐺 �𝑘𝑘−1
ℎ=𝑠𝑠 �� 
= 
 
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁�
𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
∙ ���𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘−1
𝑎𝑎=0
𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1
∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)� 
  
This liability is calculated using the notional philosophy, i.e. the liability to contributors 
is the sum of the pension balances allocated to retirement of all active contributors (past 
service liability for active members).  
Liability to current contributors for disability 
The NDC liability to contributors for disability is: 
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 =  �𝐾𝐾(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒(𝑇𝑇)𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1  [33.] 
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= 
���𝐾𝐾(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1) ∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1,𝑡𝑡−1)�𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1
∙ (1 + 𝐺𝐺) ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘−1𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤 � = 
𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇�
𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
∙ ���𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘−1
𝑎𝑎=0
𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1
∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)� 
B) The redistributive part (NCR) 
NCR liability to pensioners for retirement 
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁[𝑁𝑁] 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 = � 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼�����������������
𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁
∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑤𝑤−(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴)
𝑘𝑘=0  
[34.] = 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 ∙ � 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) ∙
𝑤𝑤−(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴)
𝑘𝑘=0
𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘
𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼  
NCR liability to pensioners for disability 
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁[𝑇𝑇] 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 = �𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃��������(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1
�����������
𝛿𝛿𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 + � 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃��������(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤−(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴)
𝑘𝑘=1�����������������
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠
  
=  
���𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 ∙𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘
𝑎𝑎=1
� ∙
𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1
?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘
𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼  
[35.] 
+  
� ��𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎=1
𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 ∙𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 � ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼
𝑤𝑤−(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴)
𝑘𝑘=1
 
 
Where, the present value of the supplementary benefit for the group of disabled people 
aged 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑠𝑠 can be expressed as: 
𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) = 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼  [36.] 
Similarly, the present value of the supplementary benefit for the total disabled pensioners 
in the working ages: 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃�������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = �𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙𝑘𝑘
𝑎𝑎=1
𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) [37.] 
Likewise, the present value of the supplementary benefit for the total disabled pensioners 
in the retirement ages can be expressed as: 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃�������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = �𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃������(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 ∙𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎=1
𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡) [38.] 
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Being, the average supplementary benefit for disabled people at age 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 + 𝑘𝑘: 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃����(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �𝑃𝑃(Ω,𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] , 0� ∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒=1 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)  [39.] 
NCR liability to contributors for retirement and disability 
If the “Swedish” principle were applied, the liability to contributors for retirement and 
disability due to the NCRs should be zero.  
Instead, if it were to break the principle of not making explicit projections, by taking into 
account the future wage development, the inclusion of a MPB would imply the valuation 
of the accrued minimum benefit by means of the prospective measure by the forecasted 
method. Obviously this amount, 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒, will be higher than the sum of the pension balances 
of active contributors, 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒, being the difference in the liability to contributors for 
retirement and disability.  
For retirement: 
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁[𝑁𝑁] 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 
[40.] 
= 
𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡) ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼 ∙ � 𝐵𝐵∗ℎ𝐴𝐴
ℎ=1�������������������������
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎
−  𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁 ∙ ���𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘
𝑎𝑎=0
𝐴𝐴−1
𝑘𝑘=0
∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐵𝐵∗ℎ�
�������������������������
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡���������������������������������������������������
𝑉𝑉[𝑅𝑅] 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐
 
− 
�𝐾𝐾(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑁𝑁)𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1�������
𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
�������������������������
𝑉𝑉
𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑁𝑁] 
𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐
 
Being 𝐵𝐵∗ = 1+𝐺𝐺
1+𝐹𝐹
 an indexing factor. 
Anagously, for disability: 
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁[𝑇𝑇] 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 − 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 
[41.] 
= 
 
�𝑃𝑃�(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1
∙ 𝑇𝑇(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) ∙ ?̈?𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝛼𝛼 ∙ � 𝐵𝐵∗ℎ𝐴𝐴
ℎ=1���������������������������
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎
 
− 
 𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇 ���𝑛𝑛(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑘𝑘
𝑎𝑎=0
𝐴𝐴−1
𝑘𝑘=0
∙ 𝑦𝑦(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝐵𝐵∗ℎ�
�������������������������
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
 
− 
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�𝐾𝐾(𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒+𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑇𝑇)𝐴𝐴
𝑘𝑘=1�������
𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
�������������������������
𝑉𝑉
𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶[𝑇𝑇] 
𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐
 
The assets side and the steady state balance ratio. 
The system's contribution asset ( 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆) can be understood as the maximum level of 
liabilities ( 𝑉𝑉𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆) that can be financed by the contribution rate.  
A different question is the redistributive element of the scheme, i.e. the commitments to 
pensioners and contributors to cover NCR rights. In our proposal the counterpart on the 
assets side is the buffer fund allocated to back up the non-contributory rights ( 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆) 
that should be financed from general revenues. Therefore, 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆�������������𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 = 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆�����������
𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎  [42.] 
The value of the system's contribution asset is the product of the system's turnover 
duration (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆) and the value of the NDC system’s contributions (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆) made in that period 
for the retirement and disability contingencies: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑺𝑺  ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 [43.] 
The 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑺𝑺 for the system is interpreted as the number of years expected to elapse before 
the committed liabilities with contributors (pay-in, 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆) and pensioners (pay-out, 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 ) 
both retirement and disability contingencies are completely renewed at the current 
contribution level.  
In the case of retirement, the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑹𝑹 indicates the expected years the contribution will stay 
in the system if it were paid by a hypothetical contributor of 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 years and remained within 
the contribution liability until retirement age was reached (pay-in, 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒), and 
was then received by a hypothetical able/healthy pensioner of 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 years after remaining 
within the liability to this type of pensioners during the pay-out (𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 − 𝐴𝐴).  
Similarly for the disability contingency, the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 represents the expected years a 
monetary unit contributed to the system will stay in the system if it were paid by a 
contributor of 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶  years and remained within the liability to contributors until the affiliate 
became a disability recipient (pay-in, 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇), and was then received by a disabled pensioner 
of 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 years after remaining within the liability to this type of pensioners during the pay-
out (𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇). 
The system's turnover duration can be calculated as the weighted average of the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 for 
both contingencies, disability (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇) and retirement (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁), with the weighting being the 
spending on pensions by contingency (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁) as a part of total spending (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶). 
Thus: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 =  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶  [44.] 
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The system's turnover duration can also be calculated as the difference between the 
weighted average of the average ages of disability (𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇) and retirement (𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁), with the 
weightings here being spending on pensions per contingency as part of total spending and 
the average age of the contributors (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 ). The analytical expression for the 
system's 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 can also be expressed in the form of pay-out and pay-in durations: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 = (𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 − 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 )�������(𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷+𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 + (𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 − 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 )�������(𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅+𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶  
[45.] 
Finally, the impact of introducing the MPB on the (A)BS are the liabilities originated 
from NCRs, and this needs to have an equivalent entry on the assets side. In our proposal 
there are two entries, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁, and their amounts reveal the present value of 
the NCRs. Thus an NDC scheme providing an MPB becomes a special type of DB system 
(mixed o hybrid) and is partially funded in this approach. 
The system's buffer fund ( 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁
𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆
) that gives credibility and financial sustainability to the 
pensions promises made in the form of the MPB can be computed as follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁
𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 = 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 − 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆  
[46.] 
= 
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡
𝑟𝑟 +  𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 − 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇���������������
𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑
+ 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 +  𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 − 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁���������������𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅  
and the amount of this is the present value of the public subsidies needed to finance the 
MPB. 
It is also straightforward to obtain the value of the system's public contribution asset 
which is the product of the system's turnover duration (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆) and the value of the 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 
public contributions ( 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆) made in that period by the sponsor in order to pay for the 
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠, and this is equivalent to the system's buffer fund: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑺𝑺  ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 [47.] 
If the approach adopted to back up the increase in liabilities due to the introduction of an 
MPB is the buffer fund method, the higher the level of the stipulated MPB, the higher the 
degree of funding (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆) needed to maintain the system's financial equilibrium (short-
term sustainability). The degree of funding (level of funding) is the ratio between the 
amount of the buffer fund and the system’s total liabilities: 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 =  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆  [48.] 
Finally, the sustainability indicator of the sytem called the steady state balance ratio (𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆, 
the ratio between the system’s assets and liabilities) has to be equal to one in the case of 
a balanced pension system, our primary assumption. In our model, the balance ratio can 
be broken down by contingencies with the weightings here being the liabilities per 
contingency as part of total liabilities: 
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𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆 = 𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 ∙ � 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 +  𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐�𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 ∙ � 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 +  𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐�𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆  [49.] 
 
